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INTRODUCTION 
 In a 1959 lecture, the late physicist Richard Feynman famously observed that, in 
principle, nothing prevents “the possibility of [humans] maneuvering things atom by 
atom.”1 Today, the scientific field that Feynman foresaw—nanotechnology—not only 
exists, but receives over one billion dollars in federal funding per year for research in 
fields as varied as mechanical and electrical engineering, biology, medicine, information 
technology, optics, and cognitive science.2 Speculation by popular commentators about 
what this research ultimately will mean for humanity ranges from a utopian vision of 
boundless energy and zero pollution to a “gray goo” nightmare of self-replicating 
nanodevices that cause incomprehensibly vast material destruction.3  
                                                 
∗ Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. This research was supported, in part, by the National 
Science Foundation’s Nanotechnology and Interdisciplinary Research Award #0304483. For helpful 
comments and suggestions, I thank . . . . 
1 Richard P. Feynman, There’s Plenty of Room at the Bottom, ENG. & SCI. (1960). 
2 The 21st Century Nanotechnology Research and Development Act, passed in 2003, allocates 
nearly $3.7 billion to nanotechnology research from 2005 to 2008, not including substantial expenditures 
on defense related nanoscale research. 
3 Compare Lynn. L. Bergeson & Bethami Auerbach, 21 ENVTL. FORUM 30, 32 (March/April 
2004) (calling nanotechnology “perhaps the ultimate sustainable development tool”) and Gary Stix, Little 
Big Science, SCI. AMERICAN 32, 37, Sept. 16, 2001 (“If the nano concept holds together, it could, in fact lay 
the groundwork for a new industrial revolution.”), with Bill Joy, Why the Future Doesn’t Need Us, WIRED, 
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Even among expert observers, opinions of nanotechnology vary widely in their 
tone and content. A committee convened by the U.S. National Research Council, for 
instance, breathlessly predicted that “[w]ith potential applications in virtually every 
existing industry and new applications yet to be discovered, nanoscale science and 
technology will no doubt emerge as one of the major drivers of economic growth in the 
first part of the new millennium.”4 In contrast, given the dearth of knowledge presently 
available regarding human health and environmental consequences of nanomaterials, a 
report issued in Britain by The Royal Society and The Royal Academy of Engineering 
recommended “as a precautionary measure that factories and research laboratories treat 
manufactured nanoparticles and nanotubes as if they were hazardous.”5 
 Although it would be easy to overstate the distinction between U.S. and European 
approaches to risk regulation,6 it is nevertheless striking how the reports of these 
respective national agencies appear to reinforce the common perception that U.S. experts 
and policymakers today favor less conservative environmental, health, and safety 
measures than their European counterparts. The British scientific societies, for instance, 
called for a national prohibition on “the use of free nanoparticles in environmental 
applications such as remediation of groundwater,”7 pending development of better 
scientific information and understanding regarding the potential consequences of such 
releases. Researchers in the United States, on the other hand, already are engaging in 
                                                                                                                                                 
August 4, 2000, available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/8.04/joy_pr.html (“Our most powerful 
21st-century technologies - robotics, genetic engineering, and nanotech - are threatening to make humans 
an endangered species.”). See also Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Environmental Regulation of Nanotechnology, 
31 ENVTL. L. REP. __ (2001) (noting that predictions of the environmental implications of nanotechnology 
range from “the most radical of the green visions” to the “worry that rogue nanodevices will devour the 
planet”).  
4 COMMITTEE FOR THE REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL NANOTECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE, DIVISION ON 
ENGINEERING AND PHYSICAL SCIENCES, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SMALL WONDERS, ENDLESS 
FRONTIERS: A REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL NANOTECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE 2 (2002). 
5 See, e.g., THE ROYAL SOCIETY AND THE ROYAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING, NANOSCIENCE AND 
NANOTECHNOLOGIES: OPPORTUNITIES AND UNCERTAINTIES x (July, 2004). 
6 As Jonathan Wiener has noted, the common perception that the United States tends to favor more 
permissive policies than the European Union overlooks important exceptions and nuances—witness, for 
instance, the stronger European embrace of nuclear power or the greater U.S. willingness to deter public 
smoking. See Jonathan B. Wiener, Whose Precaution After All ? A Comment on the Comparison and 
Evolution of Risk Regulatory Systems, 13 DUKE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 207 (2003). See also Jonathan B. 
Wiener & Michael D. Rogers, Comparing Precaution in the United States and Europe, 5 J. RISK RES. 317 
(2002). Such ready counterexamples notwithstanding, there remains an important sense in which U.S. and 
European policymakers believe themselves to be engaged in a debate over appropriate regulatory 
approaches going forward. See, e.g., ARIE TROUWBORST, EVOLUTION AND STATUS OF THE PRECAUTIONARY 
PRINCIPLE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 82 (2002) (describing U.S.-led opposition to inclusion of the PP in the 
international convention on persistent organic pollutants on the basis that the principle was “unscientific”); 
id. at 138 (describing U.S. opposition to reliance on the PP within a report on risk analysis principles and 
guidelines at the Codex Alimentarius Commission). Explicating the theoretical and practical differences of 
these approaches therefore remains a significant exercise, regardless of how closely U.S. and European 
regulations and attitudes in the past conform to the common stereotype.  
7 THE ROYAL SOCIETY AND THE ROYAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING, supra note __, at x. 
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field releases of nanoparticles in hopes of uncovering substances capable of remediating 
pollution.8 Similarly, a European Union scientific committee carefully scrutinized the 
health risks of sunscreen products that contain free nanoparticles, ultimately refusing to 
approve microfine zinc oxide for use as a UV filter in light of suggestive evidence that 
the substance might pass through the skin and damage DNA.9 During the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA)’s review of nanoparticle-containing sunscreens, on the other 
hand, the agency confidently opined that chemical substances shown to be safe at the 
macroscale also can be assumed, without further investigation, to be safe at the 
nanoscale.10 
 This apparent difference in regulatory attitude between the United States and 
Europe often is said to emerge from the jurisdictions’ contrasting stances toward two 
policymaking paradigms that compete for acceptance within environmental, health, and 
safety regulation: One—known as cost-benefit analysis (CBA) and increasingly 
associated with the United States11—strives to enhance social welfare by predicting, 
weighting, and aggregating all relevant consequences of policy proposals in order to 
identify those choices that represent welfare-maximizing uses of public resources; the 
other—associated with the precautionary principle (PP) and the European approach to 
risk regulation12—eschews optimization in favour of more pragmatic forms of 
decisionmaking. One oft-cited articulation of the PP, for instance, seeks to trigger an 
incremental process of risk regulation through the simple admonition, “When an activity 
                                                 
8 See W. Zhang, Nanoscale Iron Particles for Environmental Remediation: An Overview, 5 J. 
NANOPARTICLE RES. 323 (2003). 
9 See SCCNFP, Opinion Concerning Zinc Oxide (Colipa nS76). SCCNFP/0690/03, available at 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/health/ph_risk/committees/sccp/documents/out242_en.pdf.  
10 See FDA, 64 Fed. Reg. 27666, 27671 (1999). 
11 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE ix (2002) (“Gradually, and in fits and starts, 
American government is becoming a cost-benefit state.”) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT 
STATE]. 
12 See, e.g., Treaty on European Union, Official Journal C 191, 29 July 1992, at art. 130r (stating 
that EC environmental policy “shall be based on the precautionary principle”); Commission of the 
European Community, Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, February 2, 
2000, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/health_consumer/library/pub/pub07_en.pdf. See also 
Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, The Precautionary Principle as a Basis for Decisionmaking, The 
Economist’s Voice, Vol. 2, No. 2, Article 8 (2005) (noting that “[t]he European Union has taken a 
leadership role in promoting the precautionary principle as a basis for making decisions on environmental 
policy and other areas”); Cass R. Sunstein, Precautions Against What? The Availability Heuristic and 
Cross-Cultural Risk Perceptions, Chicago John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 220 at 1-2 
(2d Series, August 2004) (observing that “[i]t has become standard to say that with respect to risks, Europe 
and the United States can be distinguished along a single axis: Europe accepts the Precautionary Principle 
and the United States does not”) [hereinafter, Precautions Against What?]; Gail Charnley & E. Donald 
Elliott, Democratization of Risk Analysis, in HUMAN AND ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 1399, 1401 (Dennis J. Paustenbach ed., 2002) (“When Europeans call for decision based on ‘the 
precautionary principle’ in international forums, they are challenging the core premise of the American 
legal culture.”). 
  4
raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures 
should be taken even if some cause-and-effect relationships are not fully established.”13 
Despite the efforts of numerous scholars to forge a middle path between these 
extremes of “comprehensive rationality and incrementalism,”14 today the debate over 
CBA and the PP in the environmental, health, and safety context remains as polarized as 
ever. On the one hand, several influential commentators—including Matthew Adler and 
Eric Posner,15 Kenneth Arrow,16 Justice Stephen Breyer,17 Judge Richard Posner,18 Cass 
Sunstein,19 and others20—have come to the conclusion that the normative case in favor of 
                                                 
13 Peter Montague, The Precautionary Principle, RACHEL’S ENV’T & HEALTH WKLY., Feb. 19, 
1998, at 1, available at http://www.monitor.net/rachel/r586.html (describing and quoting the 1998 
Wingspread Declaration). See also 1991 Convention on the Ban of Import into Africa and the Control of 
Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes Within Africa, art. 3(f) (requiring 
implementation of “the precautionary principle to pollution prevention through the application of clean 
production methods, rather than the pursuit of a permissible emissions approach based on assimilative 
capacity assumptions.”). Other formulations of the PP do not contain an affirmative requirement to 
undertake precautionary measures. Instead, they simply state that scientific uncertainty by itself should not 
be taken to weigh against the adoption of precautionary measures. See, e.g., United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development: Convention on Biological Diversity, preamble, 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992) 
(declaring that “where there is a threat of significant reduction or loss of biological diversity, lack of full 
scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to avoid or minimize such a 
threat”). It is sometimes argued that this interpretation of the PP is “trivially true.” Proponents of this 
version of the principle, however, offer their seemingly trivial reminder in response to “the self-interested 
claims of private groups demanding unambiguous evidence of harm” before environmental, health, and 
safety regulations are imposed. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 
1003 (2003). Such claims have proven surprisingly successful in many policy debates (including especially 
the U.S. climate change debate), despite the fact that “no rational society requires” full certainty before 
acting. Id. 
14 Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393, 395 
(1981). For examples of scholarship aiming to bridge the divide between the PP and CBA, see DANIEL A. 
FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 
(1999); Symposium Issue, The Pragmatic Ecologist: Environmental Protection as a Jurisdynamic 
Experience, 87 MINN. L. REV. 847 (2003); J. B. Ruhl, Working Both (Positivist) Ends Toward a New 
(Pragmatist) Middle in Environmental Law, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 524 (2000); J. B. Ruhl, A 
Manifesto for the Radical Middle, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 385, 385-86 (2002). 
15 See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L. J. 165 
(1999). 
16 See Kenneth J. Arrow et al., Is There a Role for Cost-Benefit Analysis in Environmental, Health, 
and Safety Regulation?, 272 SCIENCE 221 (1996); Kenneth J. Arrow & Robert C. Lind, Uncertainty and the 
Evaluation of Public Investment Decisions, 60 AM. ECON. REV. 364, 366-67 (1970). 
17 STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 
(1993). 
18 RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE (2004) [hereinafter, POSNER, 
CATASTROPHE]; Richard Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Definition, Justification and Comment on 
Conference Papers, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1153 (2000). 
19 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005) 
[hereinafter SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR]; SUNSTEIN, COST-BENEFIT STATE, supra note __; Sunstein, Beyond 
the Precautionary Principle, supra note __; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK & REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT (2002) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, RISK & REASON]; Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default 
Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1059 (2000). 
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CBA is simply overwhelming and that competing paradigms such as the PP are either 
incoherent or inappropriate as frameworks for risk regulation. The conclusion of these 
thinkers is particularly notable in light of their acknowledgment that CBA suffers from a 
number of conceptual and practical limitations of its own. Nevertheless, CBA’s 
proponents increasingly believe that the “first generation debate” about the procedure’s 
normative desirability is over and that today the important questions concern “second 
generation” issues of how best to implement CBA in the environmental, health, and 
safety regulation context.21 The basic superiority of CBA as a policy tool for risk 
regulation, in other words, is no longer seriously doubted. 
Except, of course, that it is, and not just by the “environmental Darth Vader[s]” of 
the world,22 but by serious, thoughtful observers of the administrative state.23 For 
instance, Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling maintain that regulatory CBA as 
commonly practiced is flawed for at least four critical reasons: “[T]he standard economic 
approaches to valuation are inaccurate and implausible; the use of discounting [to 
compare intertemporal costs and benefits] improperly trivializes future harms and the 
irreversibility of some environmental problems; the reliance [of CBA] on aggregate, 
monetized benefits excludes questions of fairness and morality; and the value-laden and 
complex cost-benefit process is neither objective nor transparent.”24 Moreover, the 
response of some CBA proponents to call for a “modest, nonsectarian”25 brand of cost-
                                                                                                                                                 
20 See, e.g., Mark Geistfeld, Reconciling Cost-Benefit Analysis With the Principle That Safety 
Matters More Than Money, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 114 (2001); Robert H. Frank, Why Is Cost-Benefit Analysis 
So Controversial?, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 913 (2000); W. Kip Viscusi, Regulating the Regulators, 63 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1423 (1996). 
21 SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE, supra note __, at xi. See also SUNSTEIN, RISK & REASON, 
supra note __, at 5-6 (asserting that “‘first-generation’ debate about whether to base regulatory choices on 
cost-benefit analysis at all . . . is now ending, with a substantial victory for the proponents of cost-benefit 
analysis”); Hahn & Sunstein, supra note __, at 6 (“We do not believe there is any principled way of making 
policy decisions without making the best possible effort to balance all the relevant costs of a policy against 
the benefits.”). 
22 Alex Kozinski, Gore Wars, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1742, 1767 (2002) (reviewing BJØRN LOMBORG, 
THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST: MEASURING THE REAL STATE OF THE WORLD (2001)). 
23 See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF 
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004) [hereinafter ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, RICELESS]; 
SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A PRAGMATIC 
APPROACH (2003); Gregory C. Keating, Pricelessness and Life: An Essay for Guido Calabresi, 64 
MARYLAND L. REV. 159 (2005); Thomas O. McGarity, MTBE: A Precautionary Tale, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 281 (2004) [hereinafter, McGarity, MTBE]; Thomas O. McGarity, The Goals of Environmental 
Legislation, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFFAIRS L. REV. 529 (2004) [hereinafter McGarity, Goals]; Gregory C. 
Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of Cost-Justification, 56 VAND. L. REV. 653 (2003); Amy 
Sinden, Cass Sunstein’s Cost-Benefit Lite: Economics for Liberals, 29 COLUMBIA J. ENVTL. L. 191 (2004); 
Thomas O. McGarity & Ruth Ruttenberg, Counting the Costs of Health, Safety, and Environmental 
Regulation, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1997 (2002); Thomas O. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 7 
(1998); David M. Driesen, The Societal Cost of Environmental Regulation: Beyond Administrative Cost-
Benefit Analysis, 24 ECOLOGY L. Q. 545 (1997). 
24 Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of 
Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1563 (2002). 
25 Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving Federal 
Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, Chicago-John M. Olin Law & Economics Working 
Paper No. 150 at 7 (2002). 
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benefit calculation in light of these arguable shortcomings does not satisfy thinkers such 
as Ackerman and Heinzerling. In their view, CBA’s flaws render the procedure 
irredeemable as a device for setting standards of environmental, health, and safety 
protection.26  Accordingly, they applaud the fact the precautionary approach continues to 
enjoy more prominence and support than CBA outside of U.S. academic and policy 
circles27—a fact that critics instead want to attribute to such failings as poor 
information,28 cognitive error,29 and public hysteria.30   
This Article, which is part of a larger project on the competing merits of CBA and 
the PP,31 examines one specific plank of the case against the PP: the claim that the 
principle’s ignorance of the opportunity costs of precaution leads to indeterminate or 
impoverishing policy advice. Because PP defenders emphasize the limits of human 
knowledge and the frequency of unpleasant surprises from technology and industrial 
development, they prefer an ex ante stance of precaution whenever a proposed activity 
meets some threshold possibility of causing severe harm to human health or the 
environment.32 Importantly, they prefer this stance even in the face of potential 
                                                 
26 See PRICELESS, supra note __, at 219-220 (arguing that “the most fundamental problem is not in 
the details of any particular cost-benefit analysis, but rather in the framing decision about which policies 
are and which are not subject to such analyses”). 
27 In addition to its expression in European Union law and in the domestic laws and regulations of 
many nations outside of the E.U., see supra note 12, the PP also has appeared in a number of multilateral 
documents and is even considered by some observers to be a strong candidate for inclusion within 
customary international law. See Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.C.J. 288 (Sept. 22) 412 (Palmer, J., 
dissenting) (observing that “the norm involved in the precautionary principle has developed rapidly and 
may now be a principle of customary international law relating to the environment.”); Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25) 342 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting) (noting 
that the PP is “gaining increasing support as part of the international law of the environment”).  See also D. 
Freestone & E. Hey, Origins and Development of the Precautionary Principle, in THE PRECAUTIONARY 
PRINCIPLE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (D. Freestone & E. Hey eds., 1996), p. 94 (“[T]he precautionary 
concept has been included in virtually every recent treaty and policy document related to the protection and 
preservation of the environment.”); D. Freestone & Z. Makuch, The New International Environmental Law 
of Fisheries: The 1995 UN Straddling Stocks Convention, in 7 YIEL 3, 11  (1996) (referring to the PP as a 
“concept, which in less than a decade has assumed primary importance in international environmental 
forums”); F. ORREGA VICUÑA, THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HIGH SEAS FISHERIES (1999), p. 
156 (“The precautionary principle . . . has taken a central place in the discussion of most international 
regimes for environmental protection.”). 
28 See AARON WILDAVSKY, BUT IS IT TRUE?: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH 
AND SAFETY ISSUES 1-2 (1995). 
29 See SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON, supra note __, at 28-52. 
30 See Tumur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. 
REV. 683 (1999) (positing that rational risk regulation is confounded by the political pressure exerted by 
“populist firestorms”). 
31 See DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, ECOLOGIC: COMPLEXITY, COGNITION, AND OUR ENVIRONMENTAL 
FUTURE (unpublished manuscript). 
32 The statement in the text captures the essential structure of the PP. See, e.g., TROUWBORST, 
supra note __, at 52 (“[I]n the presence of a threat of (non-negligible) environmental harm accompanied by 
scientific uncertainty, regulatory action should nevertheless be taken to prevent or remedy the hazard 
concerned.”). Important implementation issues then include: (1) the degree of credibility or seriousness of 
threat required in order to trigger the precautionary obligation; (2) the precise form that regulatory response 
should take; (3) and the manner in which the regulatory response should be revisited and revised over time.  
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benefits—such as those promised by the use of nanoparticles in groundwater remediation 
or skin protection—that may themselves be ameliorative of environmental, health, and 
safety dangers. Although their reasoning has never been perfectly clear,33 advocates of 
the PP regard such foregone benefits as conceptually distinct from, and somehow less 
central than, the more affirmative consequences that may result from allowing potentially 
harmful activities to proceed.  
Naturally, this asymmetric aspect of the PP generates strident criticism, 
particularly from consequentialist-utilitarian thinkers such as those who advocate CBA. 
Along with substitute risks, lulling effects, and other purportedly overlooked health 
consequences of precautionary regulation,34 these critics argue that the PP’s failure to 
treat opportunity costs pari passu with the primary risks targeted by policy measures is 
simply indefensible. Moreover, they argue that if opportunity costs of regulation were 
taken into account in the design of the PP, then “the real problem with the principle 
[would become] that it offers no guidance—not that it is wrong, but that it forbids all 
courses of action, including regulation.”35 To the PP’s detractors, therefore, the principle 
                                                 
33 The classic defense of the PP contends that the benefits of regulatory precaution consist of saved 
human lives or averted ecological harms, while the costs typically consist of lost economic profits or some 
other opportunity cost that is not viewed as fully commensurable with human or environmental harm. See 
Talbot Page, A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and Similar Risks, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 207, 22 (1978); 
Sidney A. Shapiro, Keeping the Baby and Throwing Out the Bathwater: Justice Breyer’s Critique of 
Regulation, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 721, 732 (1995); Mark Geistfeld, Reconciling Cost-Benefit Analysis with 
the Principle that Safety Matters More than Money, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 114, 118 n.14 (2001); Kristin 
Shrader-Frechette, Methodological Rules for Four Classes of Scientific Uncertainty, in SCIENTIFIC 
UNCERTAINTY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM SOLVING 12, 15 (1995). As noted infra text accompanying 
notes50-58, this incommensurability defense is partially (but only partially) undermined by the frequent 
appearance of human lives or ecological assets on both sides of the regulatory ledger. 
34 For an influential analytical overview and collection of case studies involving such “risk-risk” 
tradeoffs, see JOHN D. GRAHAM & JONATHAN BAERT WIENER, RISK VERSUS RISK (1995). 
35 Sunstein, Precautions Against What?, supra note __, at 7. See also SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR, 
supra note __, at 42 (observing that precautionary risk regulation tends to lack “concern [for] the benefits 
that are foregone as a result of precaution); Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Environment, supra 
note __, at 18 (arguing that “[w]hen the principle seems to be giving guidance, it is often because those 
who use it are focusing on one aspect of risk-related situations and neglecting others”); Cass R. Sunstein & 
Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? The Relevance of Life-Life Tradeoffs, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=691447, at 5 (“No one believes that for moral reasons, social 
planners should refuse to take account of [risk-risk] tradeoffs.”); John O. McGinnis, The Appropriate 
Hierarchy of Global Multilateralism and Customary International Law: The Example of the WTO, 44 VA. 
J. INT’L L. 229, 273 (2003) (arguing that “the precautionary principle often remains coherent only by 
focusing on the risks of action at the expense of those of inaction”); Jonathan B. Wiener, Precaution in a 
Multi-Risk World, in HUMAN AND ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1509 (Dennis 
D. Paustenbach ed., 2002); M. GOKLANY, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENT (2001); Christopher D. Stone, Is There a Precautionary Principle?, 31 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10790 (2001); Jonathan H. Adler, More Sorry Than Safe: Assessing the Precautionary 
Principle and the Proposed International Safety Protocol, 35 TEX. INT’L L. J. 173, 195 (2000) (“The 
problem is that by focusing on one set of risks—those posed by the introduction of new technologies with 
somewhat uncertain effects—the precautionary principle turns a blind eye to the harms that occur, or are 
made worse, due to the lack of technological development.”); Howard Margolis, A New Account of 
Expert/Lay Conflicts of Risk Intuition, 8 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 115 (1997); Frank B. Cross, 
Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 851 (1996); HOWARD 
MARGOLIS, DEALING WITH RISK: WHY THE PUBLIC AND THE EXPERTS DISAGREE ON ENVIRONMENTAL 
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either must be expanded to include an obligation to consider the opportunity costs of 
regulatory activity—in which case it would become woefully indeterminate—or the 
principle must be rejected as a one-sided tool likely to prolong a range of harms that 
would be alleviated in its absence. 
Despite the seemingly unimpeachable logic of this critique, the role of 
opportunity costs in environmental, health, and safety regulation actually turns out to be 
much more complicated and interesting than the CBA proponents’ account reveals. 
Undoubtedly, CBA proponents are correct to note that no society should flatly ignore the 
opportunity costs of precautionary regulation. But this is a trivial observation, for no 
serious proponent of the PP disagrees with it. Despite frequent caricature of the PP as a 
crudely asymmetric heuristic,36 PP proponents actually regard the principle as merely one 
aspect of a much more elaborate regulatory process in which the PP is applied with a 
view toward proportionality of response37 and adaptability over time.38 Just as no 
physician would unthinkingly and universally follow the precautionary mandate of the 
Hippocratic adage—“first, do no harm”—no regulator would adhere to the PP without 
paying some attention to foregone benefits, new information, and changed 
circumstances.39 Thus, the proper contrast between CBA and the PP is not one of 
comprehensive and partial modes of analysis, as critics of the PP assert,40 but rather of 
static and dynamic, optimizing and incremental, formalized and pragmatic 
decisionmaking models. 
As Parts I and II of this Article demonstrate, there are underappreciated benefits 
to the PP’s more modest approach. Specifically, unlike the optimization framework of 
CBA, which proceeds awkwardly in the absence of fully characterized risks and 
consensus normative agreement on exogenized choice criteria, the PP’s approach reflects 
great sensitivity to the fact that decisionmaking in the face of many environmental 
problems demands not only substantive, but also procedural and discursive rationality. 
This is particularly the case with regard to the kinds of multidimensional, long-term 
                                                                                                                                                 
ISSUES 2 (1996) (“Good judgment—judgment that will look reasonable when the passions of the moment 
have passed—has to deal with what I label the ‘fungibility’ (between opportunities and dangers) that 
ordinarily confronts us.”). 
36 See John S. Applegate, supra note __, at 29 (“Critics of the [PP] often misrepresent its 
regulatory standard as unitary and draconian: to ban or forgo an activity or technology altogether. Neither 
the texts of the [PP] nor the writings of its advocates bears this out.”). 
37 See Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission on the 
precautionary principle, COM(2000) 1 (Feb. 2, 2000) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Communication from 
the Commission], available at http:// europa/eu/int/comm/dgs/health_consumer/library/pub/pub07_en.pdf. 
38 See Joanne Scott, The Precautionary Principle Before the European Courts, in PRINCIPLES OF 
EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 21 (Richard Macrory et al. eds., 2004) (observing that the PP is applied 
in a conditional, preliminary fashion that not only allows decisionmakers to “exercise their judgment with 
respect to risk,” but also helps to avoid the possibility that the PP “will threaten paralysis in the manner 
feared by [critics of the principle]”).  
39 See infra text accompanying notes 159-162 (describing various “safety valves” associated with 
the precautionary approach that allow for relaxation of its dictates in appropriate circumstances). 
40 See supra note 34. 
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questions that are raised by the paradigm of sustainable development law,41 and that 
reveal cost-benefit optimization to be both analytically and democratically unsatisfactory. 
Thus, Parts I and II conclude that the most important task presently facing scholars of 
environmental law is not, as CBA proponents would have it, to further refine the 
technical details of the optimization paradigm in order to suit the sustainable 
development challenge. Rather, the task is to reconcile environmental management’s 
need for flexibility and dynamism with democracy’s need for meaningful public input. 
The PP by itself does not resolve such challenges. However, significantly—and in 
contrast to CBA—it does acknowledge their existence and importance. 
Although the critique of CBA offered in Parts I and II is aggressive, the aim is not 
to persuade readers of the force of any particular attack or even of the attacks in 
combination. Rather, the aim is to unsettle the view that the “first generation debate” in 
risk regulation has been unequivocally resolved in favor of CBA.42 Raising doubts in this 
manner serves to lend urgency to the more fundamental argument that is offered in Part 
III—the argument that CBA’s most worrisome aspect is not the results that it generates in 
particular policy cases, but the threat that it poses over time to our ability to continue 
coherently debating how we might better manage environmental risk and achieve 
sustainable development. By its nature, CBA tends to suggest that government policies 
are “hostage to what the facts turn out to show in particular domains,”43 such that no 
distinctive notion of collective decisionmaking responsibility is deemed necessary or 
appropriate. So conceived, the methodology is unable in the end to account for the 
normativity of what the facts tell us—that is, for the assumption that some agent or 
institution somewhere should act in accordance with the facts so discovered.44 In the long 
                                                 
41 See Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainable Development and Private Global Governance, 83 TEXAS L. 
REV. 2109 (2005) [hereinafter Kysar, Sustainable Development]. The PP tends to be closely associated with 
the sustainable development movement. See 1990 Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development in 
the ECE Region para. 7 (“In order to achieve sustainable development, policies must be based on the 
precautionary principle.”); J.B. Ruhl, A Five-Dimensional Algorithm for Sustainability; James Cameron, 
The Precautionary Principle, in TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE MILLENIUM 239, 239-240 (Gary P. 
Sampson and W. Bradnee Chambers eds., 2002) (“The precautionary principle is part of a system of rules 
designed to guide human behavior towards the ideal of an environmentally sustainable economy.”); Tim 
O’Riordan, Andrew Jordan, & James Cameron, The Evolution of the Precautionary Principle, in 
REINTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 9, 13 (Tim O’Riordan, James Cameron, & Andrew 
Jordan eds., 2001) (noting that the PP’s “future lies in the debate and policy setting of sustainability, rather 
than environmentalism”); Michael C. Farmer & Alan Randall, The Rationality of a Safe Minimum 
Standard, 74 LAND ECON. 287, 287 (1998) (noting that some “advocates of the precautionary principle 
expand [safe minimum standard] protections into a comprehensive, strong sustainability objective”). Like 
the PP, the sustainable development concept has been harshly criticized as indeterminate and potentially 
counterproductive. See, e.g., WILFRED BECKERMAN, A POVERTY OF REASON: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (2002). Nevertheless, also like the PP, it has remained prominent and influential, 
particularly outside of the United States. See James Gustave Speth, International Environmental Law: Can 
It Deal With the Big Issues?, 28 VT. L. REV. 779, 790 (2004). 
42 See supra text accompanying note 21. 
43 Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note __, at 30. 
44 Cf. SCHEFFLER, supra note __, at 158 (observing that utilitarians must offer a “plausible and 
detailed account of utilitarian social and economic institutions and of the processes by which, in a society 
regulated by utilitarian principles, motives would develop that were capable of generating ongoing support 
for those institutions and principles”).  
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run, such an approach not only may prove disruptive to the project of reasoning through 
daunting moral issues such as international and intergenerational environmental 
responsibility, but it also may undermine even its own attractiveness as a standard of 
social choice. 
Critics have attempted to dismiss the PP as “incoherent,”45 “indeterminate,”46 
“paralyzing,”47 “worse than unhelpful,”48 and “literally senseless.”49 The most desirable 
feature of the PP, however, is not necessarily the level of environmental, health, and 
safety harm that it promises to avoid, but the more subtle manner in which the principle 
reflects and reinforces the notion that political communities are distinct entities with 
special responsibility to evaluate their decisions and the effects of their actions not only 
on themselves, but also on other societies and other human generations. Despite its 
seemingly unequivocal command, the Hippocratic principle—“first, do no harm”—is not 
only or even primarily a behavioral prescription. It is instead a subtle, but steadfast 
reminder to the professional so cautioned that her actions carry distinctive moral weight 
and responsibility. It is a reminder most fundamentally to be moral. Similarly, the PP’s 
requirement that we pause to consider the potentially catastrophic or irreversible 
consequences of our action is at bottom a reminder that social choices express a 
collective moral identity. Our identity. An identity that cannot be located within the 
freestanding optimization logic of CBA, although we need to consider its content more 
now than perhaps ever before. 
I. THE PROBLEM OF UNCERTAINTY 
Every decision to act or refrain from acting implies a range of alternatives that, 
for better or worse, are not selected. For poets, it is these foregone options that constitute 
the “saddest” category of human thought and experience: what “might have been.”50 
Likewise, for critics of the PP, it is primarily these counterfactual costs of behaving 
according to the principle’s dictates that render the device so objectionable as a basis for 
public policymaking. The threat of genetically modified “super weeds”51 looms large, as 
do the threats of catastrophic climate change52 and runaway nanodevices that transform 
                                                 
45 Todd J. Zywicki, Baptists?: The Political Economy of Environmental Interest Groups, 53 CASE 
WES. L. REV. 315, 333 (2002). 
46 Stone, supra note __, at 10799. 
47 Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, supra note __, at 1004. 
48 Cass R. Sunstein, Your Money or Your Life, New Republic, March 11, 2004. 
49 Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, supra note __, at 1008. 
50 See John Greenleaf Whittier, Maud Muller (“For of all sad words of tongue and pen, the saddest 
are these, ‘It might have been.’”). 
51 See Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process-Product Distinction and the 
Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525 (2004) [hereinafter Kysar, Preferences for 
Processes] (describing biological evidence of genetic trait dispersion among neighboring plants from 
genetically modified crops). 
52 See Douglas A. Kysar, Climate Change, Cultural Transformation, and Comprehensive 
Rationality, 31 BOSTON COLLEGE ENVTL. AFFAIRS L. REV. 555 (2004) [hereinafter Kysar, Climate Change] 
(describing “abrupt climate change scenarios”). 
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the planet into “gray goo.”53 Less visible, and therefore less attended to according to 
proponents of the synoptic paradigm, are the vitamin enriched rice strains,54 the carbon 
fueled economic gains,55 and the nanoscale cancer cures56 that might be foregone if 
society were to abstain from pursuing novel technologies and other uncertain endeavors. 
More dramatically, some commentators contend that the mere act of expending 
money on regulatory compliance may create adverse health consequences, such that all of 
regulation truly is a risk-risk proposition.57 There is no limit to this brand of radical 
commensurability reasoning. For instance, although advocates of the risk-risk paradigm 
have yet to extend their approach to environmental harms, a plausible basis exists for 
doing so. Specifically, in light of the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) literature—
which purports to find a causal relationship between growth in national GDP per capita 
and environmental quality—analysts could argue that regulatory expenditures imply a 
necessary decline in environmental quality, such that regulation not only seems to entail a 
health-health tradeoff, but an environment-environment one as well.58 
Given the apparent pervasiveness of benefits foregone in the context of protective 
regulation—including especially benefits that would themselves take the form of 
improvements to human health or the environment—the logic of instrumentalist 
balancing and cost-benefit optimization might well seem inescapable. Nevertheless, as 
this Part describes, the preconditions for reliable balancing and optimization are not 
always satisfied in the environmental, health, and safety context. Instead, as the 
simplified classification scheme in Figure 1 shows, knowledge conditions can take 
                                                 
53 See Joy, supra note __ (“Among the cognoscenti of nanotechnology, this threat has become 
known as the ‘gray goo problem.’ Though masses of uncontrolled replicators need not be gray or gooey, 
the term ‘gray goo’ emphasizes that replicators able to obliterate life might be less inspiring than a single 
species of crabgrass. They might be superior in an evolutionary sense, but this need not make them 
valuable.”). 
54 See Adler, supra note __, at 200 (describing “the creation of a new strain of rice fortified with 
additional Vitamin A” that may combat “vitamin A deficiency, which can cause blindness and other ills, 
[and which] affects up to 250 million children worldwide”). 
55 See LOMBORG, supra note __, at 318 (“Despite our intuition that we naturally need to do 
something drastic . . . about global warming, economic analyses clearly show that it would be far more 
expensive to cut CO2 emission radically than to pay the costs of adaptation to the increased 
temperatures.”). 
56 See Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Nanotechnology and Regulatory Policy: Three Futures, 17 HARV. 
J. L. & TECH. 179, 186 (2003) (speculating that “specially designed nanodevices, the size of bacteria, might 
be programmed to destroy arterial plaque, or fight cancer cells, or repair cellular damage caused by aging”). 
57 See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Regulating the Regulators, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1423, 1452-1453 
(1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1533 (1996); Randall Lutter & John 
F. Morrall III, Health-Health Analysis: A New Way to Evaluate Health and Safety Regulation, 8 J. RISK & 
UNCERTAINTY 1 (1993); Randall Lutter, John Morrall, & W. Kip Viscusi, The Cost-Per-Life-Saved Cutoff 
for Safety-Enhancing Regulations, 37 ECON. INQ. 599 (1999); Frank B. Cross, When Environmental 
Regulations Kill: The Role of Health/Health Analysis, 22 ECOL. L.Q. 729 (1995); Ralph L. Keeney, 
Mortality Risks Induced by the Costs of Regulations, 8 J. RISK & UNCERT. 95 (1994); W. Kip Viscusi & 
Richard J. Zeckhauser, The Fatality and Injury Costs of Expenditures, 8 J. RISK & UNCERT. 19 (1994). 
58 See Douglas A. Kysar, Some Realism About Environmental Skepticism: The Implications of 
Bjorn Lomborg’s The Skeptical Environmentalist for Environmental Law and Policy, 30 ECOL. L. Q. 223, 
249-252 (2003) (describing and criticizing the Environmental Kuznets Curve literature). 
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diverse forms, ranging from the kind of well-characterized probability and outcome 
settings presupposed by CBA to the more stark conditions of uncertainty and ignorance 
that attract the attention of PP proponents.59 Thus, a critical challenge for risk regulators 
is to ensure that their decisionmaking models are appropriately suited to the nature and 
degree of knowledge actually held in a given policy context, whether the models concern 
the assessment of ecological or human health hazards, the anticipation of social and 
economic consequences, or some more ambitious integration of all such consequences. 
Figure 1 
 Outcomes Well 
Defined 
Outcomes Poorly 
Defined 
Probabilities Well 
Defined 
Risk Ambiguity 
Probabilities Poorly 
Defined 
Uncertainty Ignorance 
 
As this Part argues, the PP can be defended as a pragmatic decisionmaking 
heuristic that is particularly well-suited to the task of fostering consideration of how best 
to safeguard life and the environment under conditions of uncertainty and ignorance. 
Contrary to prominent critiques, the PP does not urge regulators “to be universally 
precautionary.”60 Instead, the PP focuses on particular categories of harm and separates 
them out for special treatment during early stages in the development of human 
knowledge and experience. Viewed sympathetically, this asymmetry of concern 
represents a procedurally rational mechanism for catalyzing empirical investigation, 
redressing political imbalances, and responding with prudence to threats of a potentially 
catastrophic or irreversible nature. Indeed, in many real world contexts, heuristic 
decisionmaking of the sort embodied in the PP expresses a kind of “ecological 
rationality”61—that is, a pragmatic decisionmaking approach that is well-tailored to the 
informational and cognitive constraints of actual choice environments and that is capable 
of evolving and adapting over time. 
                                                 
59 Adapted from Andy Stirling, The Precautionary Principle in Science and Technology, in 
REINTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra note __, at 61, 79. The fourth possibility—
ambiguity—seems only to attract the attention of game show hosts.  
60 Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, supra note __, at 1008. 
61 See Douglas A. Kysar et al., Are Heuristics a Problem or a Solution?, in HEURISTICS AND THE 
LAW (Christoph Engel & Gerd Gigerenzer eds., 2005). 
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A. Complexity 
Much of the divide in risk regulation can be understood as a difference of view 
over which of the boxes in Figure 1 most accurately describes our policymaking 
predicament.62 As J.B. Ruhl has observed, “[t]he prevailing schools of environmental 
policy have described our problem as a series of linear, one-dimensional decisionmaking 
systems,” an approach that assumes “economic conditions can be translated predictably 
into economic conclusions that call for prescribed economic measures, [and] 
environmental conditions can be translated predictably into environmental conclusions 
that call for environmental measures.”63 If indeed these prevailing schools are correct that 
biophysical and sociolegal systems are well-behaved—such that they follow linear 
operating rules, map onto normal or Gaussian probability distributions, and exhibit stable 
equilibrium outcomes—then data gaps and other shortcomings of human knowledge need 
not be viewed as deeply problematic.  
If, on the other hand, these systems are complex—such that they exhibit 
“behaviors such as feedback, emergence, path dependence, and nonlinearity”64—then risk 
regulators face a fundamentally different task. Not only must they assess and manage 
risks of an uncertain magnitude, but they must do so within the context of numerous, 
overlapping dynamic systems, each of which is characterized by such perplexing features 
as extreme sensitivity to minor variations in condition,65 “fat tail” probability 
distributions,66 and irreducible levels of uncertainty, or chaos.67 This is a far more 
                                                 
62 Compare David E. Adelman, The False Promise of the Genomics Revolution for Environmental 
Law, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 117 (2005) (arguing that hope for revolutionary advances in environmental 
standard-setting from the emerging field of toxicogenomics is misplaced); Cary Coglianese & Gary E. 
Marchant, Shifting Sands: The Limits of Science in Setting Risk Standards, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1255 (2004); 
and Wagner, supra note __, with Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 115, 124 (2003) (arguing that, although “pervasive uncertainties are simply assumed by 
most scholars to be part of the framework within which environmental law must operate,” developments in 
information technology and other scientific fields promise to significantly reduce environmental 
uncertainty and increase the likelihood of regulatory efficacy). 
63 J.B. Ruhl, Sustainable Development:  A Five-Dimensional Algorithm for Environmental Law, 
18 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 31, 46 (1999). See also Brian Wynne, Uncertainty and Environmental Learning: 
Reconceiving Science and Policy in the Preventive Paradigm, 2 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 111, 111 (1992) 
(observing that risk assessment was “originally developed for relatively very well structured mechanical 
problems” and that environmental systems, in contrast, “cannot be designed, manipulated and reduced to 
within the boundaries of existing analytical knowledge”). 
64 J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen:  The Problem of Regulatory Accretion 
in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L. J. 757, 763 (2003). See also Ruhl, supra note __, at 46; J.B. Ruhl, 
Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System:  How to Clean up the Environment by 
Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 933 (1997); J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a 
Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-and-Society System: A Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the 
Modern Administrative State, 45 DUKE L. J. 849 (1996); J.B. Ruhl & Harold J. Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of the 
Law in Modern Administrative States: Using Complexity Theory to Reveal the Diminishing Returns and 
Increasing Risks the Burgeoning of Law Poses to Society, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 405 (1997). 
65 See Ruhl & Salzman, supra note __, at 817-19. 
66 See Daniel A. Farber, Probabilities Behaving Badly: Complexity Theory and Environmental 
Uncertainty, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 145, 152-55 (2003). 
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intractable problem setting than has tended to be recognized in the risk regulation debate, 
even by those who critique CBA for its Herculean informational demands. Because 
complex adaptive systems contain ineliminable uncertainties that cannot be presumed to 
be insignificant, such systems by their nature are likely to present ill-posed problems—
that is, problems whose imperviousness to resolution is not driven by deficiencies in our 
epistemic position, but rather by features inherent to the problems themselves. 
CBA in particular may falter if risk regulation is characterized by complexity and 
uncertainty, given that adherence to the synoptic paradigm demands techniques and 
strategies for rendering policy spaces quantitatively tractable.68 To critics, the procedures 
adopted by proponents of the synoptic paradigm in response to this difficulty often are 
analytically and democratically unsatisfying.69 Defenders of CBA frequently respond to 
this charge by arguing that alternative approaches also are susceptible to mistake and 
manipulation, and that the virtue of CBA is its requirement that regulators exhaustively 
identify and analyze the expected consequences of policy proposals. This argument, 
however, only explains why regulators should be required to provide a comprehensive 
survey of potential policy effects, not why such effects should be aligned along a single 
numerical metric. It is the latter requirement that often forces the CBA analyst to adopt 
methods of quantification and monetization that attract criticism. 
A particularly clear demonstration of the critics’ concern can be seen in certain 
quasi-scientific attempts by the FDA to control the scope of the risk assessment process 
by adopting a presumption that novel technological processes themselves are unworthy of 
                                                                                                                                                 
67 See id. at 153. This is not to suggest that the systems are indeterminate, but rather that their rules 
of operation give rise to stunningly complex and difficult-to-predict interactions. Extremely minor, even 
immeasurable variations in conditions between two otherwise identically situated systems—such as the 
presence in one system of the proverbial flapping of a butterfly’s wings—can give rise to dramatic 
differences in outcome between the two systems only a few evolutionary steps later. The resulting “chaos” 
is not randomness per se, but rather “order masquerading as randomness,” a state of being that, although 
deterministic, nevertheless remains irreducibly uncertain. GLEICK, supra note __, at 22. 
68 See OECD, THE ECONOMIC APPRAISAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS AND POLICIES: A 
PRACTICAL GUIDE 150 (1995) (“The treatment of uncertain risk looms large in environmental appraisal. 
Converting uncertainty into risk is essential to make the problem tractable.”); Richard T. Woodward & 
Richard C. Bishop, How to Decide When Experts Disagree: Uncertainty-Based Choice Rules in 
Environmental Policy, 73 LAND ECON. 492, 505 (1997) (“If one considers a spectrum of choice problems 
from pure uncertainty to pure risk, almost all of the attention of economics has been on one extreme . . . . 
This has led to policy advice and analysis that either implicitly or explicitly requires policymakers to divine 
probability distributions.”). 
69 As Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams put it, “Government House utilitarianism” such as that 
embodied in CBA risks becoming “an outlook favouring social arrangements under which a utilitarian elite 
controls a society in which the majority may not itself share those beliefs.” Amartya Sen & Bernard 
Williams, Introduction: Utilitarianism and Beyond, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 1, 16 (Amartya Sen 
& Bernard Williams eds., 1982). Sen and Williams refer particularly to the partial disclosure conception of 
utilitarianism, in which elites apply the utilitarian calculus to social decisionmaking without disclosing their 
method of analysis, given the fear that its cold calculation might undermine the basis of social cohesion 
among citizens less capable of such enlightened reason. Compare Richard A. Posner, Our Incompetent 
Government, New Republic, Nov. 14, 2005, 23, 26 (decrying “the incapacity of our intellectual class . . . to 
think in cost-benefit terms”). 
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heightened scrutiny. As noted above,70 such an assumption underlies the agency’s 
determination that nanomaterials in consumer products such as sunscreens do not require 
an additional risk assessment if their macroscale counterparts have been previously 
evaluated. The assumption also may be located in the “substantial equivalence doctrine” 
that the FDA has used in the genetically modified agriculture context, and the 
“compositional analysis method” that it has proposed for use in the case of cloned 
livestock for human consumption.71 In all three cases, the FDA has made its risk 
assessment burden lighter by assuming that novel scientific processes (e.g., nanoscaling, 
genetic modification, cloning) are not in themselves cause for regulatory scrutiny or 
distinction, but rather only become relevant if they lead to manifest differences in the 
physical or compositional characteristics of end products as compared to conventional 
counterparts.  
The flaws with such an assumption are many.72 For present purposes, the most 
significant shortcoming is the assumption’s implicit view that “what we don’t know 
won’t hurt us.” On the FDA’s approach, situations of deep uncertainty regarding the 
potential impacts of novel technological processes are treated as unworthy of regulatory 
attention, an approach that reflects what Wendy Wagner has called the “unprecautionary 
principle.”73 In the nanotechnology context, this approach seems especially inapt, given 
that scientists believe nanoscale materials are potentially revolutionary precisely because 
they display marked differences in chemical and physical behavior as compared to their 
macroscale equivalents. Assigning the burden of proof on such issues is therefore an 
inherently political exercise, one that should be seen as affecting the distribution of power 
and knowledge in society, rather than simply being derived from it. 
Proponents of CBA have adopted more nuanced ways of dealing with incomplete 
information. Analysts sometimes contend, for instance, that the proper utilitarian 
response to situations of uncertainty is not to abandon the quest for optimization, as the 
PP appears to require, but instead to estimate and incorporate the costs and benefits of 
uncertainty directly into the optimization model. Although preferable to the FDA’s blunt 
refusal to acknowledge uncertainty, this procedure still suffers from a basic limitation: 
Without knowing the expected value of future knowledge (which depends on the same 
unknown probabilities and outcomes that render the situation imperfectly characterized 
for purposes of risk assessment and CBA), the analyst cannot identify the point at which 
broadened regulatory inspection itself is no longer cost-justified. Unwilling to concede 
uncertainty and ignorance, the analyst instead teeters on the edge of an infinite regress.74 
In the context of complex adaptive systems, this problem is especially acute because the 
analyst cannot rely on a constant trend of diminishing returns from knowledge 
                                                 
70 See supra text accompanying note 10. 
71 See Kysar, Preferences for Processes, supra note __. 
72 See id. 
73 Wendy E. Wagner, The Precautionary Principle and Chemical Regulation in the U.S., 6 HUM. 
& ECOL. RISK ASSESSMENT 459, 466-68 (2000). 
74 See Jonathan Baert Wiener, Managing the Iatrogenic Risks of Risk Management, 9 RISK 39, 73-
74 (1998) (referring to the “optimal stopping problem” raised by such dilemmas). 
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acquisition, given the possibility that minor perturbations in one period may give rise to 
dramatic effects many periods hence.  
Introducing genetically modified organisms or nanomaterials widely into field 
environments raises similar concerns, given the practically irreversible nature of such 
actions. For such decisions, proponents of CBA typically argue that the expectation 
calculus should be expanded to include whatever “option value” would be lost by 
engaging in an irreversible action with uncertain effects.75 For instance, one of the 
earliest and most significant papers in the environmental economics literature began by 
observing, “[I]f we are uncertain about the payoff to investment in development, we 
should err on the side of underinvestment, rather than overinvestment, since development 
is irreversible.”76 Proponents of the PP would, of course, wholeheartedly agree. They 
would not agree, however, that the option value of this precaution should simply be 
priced and incorporated into the efficiency calculus so that CBA can continue in “the 
usual way.”77 To PP adherents, such an exercise invites exclusionary, technocratic 
decisionmaking in the face of grave, uncertain collective choices—precisely the type of 
context that they believe instead requires inclusiveness, transparency, and candid 
acknowledgment that moral choices are being undertaken.78 
Most obviously susceptible to this critique is Delphi analysis, which is one 
prominent analytical method used by CBA practitioners to get the consequentialist-
utilitarian ball rolling, despite the presence of true uncertainty. The Delphi technique 
consists essentially of gathering subjective assessments of unknown risks from a survey 
of experts in relevant fields. By then searching for a point of convergence among the 
expert responses, analysts hope to assign a Bayesian prior subjective belief that, in turn, 
will afford some nonarbitrary basis for taking a “first stab” at calculating expected 
outcomes.79 Proponents of CBA sometimes even deny that there is such a thing as 
uncertainty, apparently taking the view that if Bayesian rather than frequentist probability 
                                                 
75 See Kenneth J. Arrow & Anthony C. Fisher, Environmental Preservation, Uncertainty, and 
Irreversibility, 88 Q. J. ECON. 312 (1974); C. Henry, Investment Decisions Under Uncertainty: The 
Irreversibility Effect, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 1066 (1974). For a leading efficiency model incorporating option 
values, see A. Myrick Freeman, The Sign and Size of Option Value, 60 LAND ECON. 1 (1984). 
76 See Arrow & Fisher, supra note __, at 317. 
77 Id. at 319. 
78 See Wynne, supra note __, at 115 (arguing that “institutionalized exaggeration of the scope and 
power of scientific knowledge creates a vacuum in which should exist a vital social discourse about the 
conditions and boundaries of scientific knowledge in relation to moral and social knowledge”).   
79 For discussion of Bayesian probability theory, see Matthew D. Adler, Against “Individual 
Risk”: A Sympathetic Critique of Risk Regulation, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1121 (2005); David E. Adelman, 
Scientific Activism and Restraint: The Interplay of Statistics, Judgment, and Procedure in Environmental 
Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 497 (2004); Stephen Charest, Bayesian Approaches to the Precautionary 
Principle, 12 DUKE ENV. L. & POL’Y F. 265 (2002). As Charest points out, the Bayesian approach may be 
an improvement over risk assessment techniques that incorporate subjective assumptions through less 
transparent means. 
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theory is adopted, some number always will be available to the cost-benefit optimizer.80 
The question immediately raised, however, is whose subjective probability assessments 
will form the basis of the Bayesian exercise. Without devoting careful attention to 
concerns of inclusiveness and participatory legitimacy, environmental policymakers risk 
obscuring essentially normative judgments through an exercise that, when properly 
understood, often merits only a weak case for deference.81 
Other approaches used by CBA practitioners when faced with true uncertainty 
include Monte Carlo analysis and similar statistical methods for generating hypothetical 
distributions of unknown probabilities. These computer techniques evaluate the effects of 
policy proposals under thousands of different states of the world such that, even in the 
face of uncertainty, analysts may be able to locate policy prescriptions that predominate 
over a wide range of possible conditions.82 Such techniques depend, however, on the 
specification of certain assumptions about the theoretical nature of unknown probabilities 
and, in keeping with the classical scientific tradition, analysts typically specify normal or 
Gaussian probability behavior.83 When applied to systems that behave instead according 
to the laws of complexity, such assumptions can lead to dramatically erroneous policy 
advice, despite the great technological sophistication of the Monte Carlo procedure.84  
                                                 
80 See Dexter Samida & David A. Weisbach, Paretian Intergenerational Discounting, __ U. CHI. 
L. REV. __ (2006) (stating that the authors “are not sure that Knightian uncertainty is a meaningful 
category”). 
81 Scholars from the AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, for instance, have 
proposed the use of Delphi techniques to fill data gaps in regulatory analysis, yet their own use of the 
methodology to argue against the desirability of environmental, health, and safety regulation raises cause 
for skepticism. See Robert W. Hahn & Rohit Malik, Is Regulation Good for You?, 27 HARV. J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 893, 898 n.21 (2005). In what amounts to an ad hoc opinion poll, “leading regulatory economists” 
were asked to estimate the percentage of major environmental, health, and safety regulations implemented 
between 1993 and 2002 that would have passed a cost-benefit test if the economists themselves were 
performing the analysis. See id. at 902. Researchers from the Center implicitly concede the deeply 
subjective nature of this exercise when they note that survey respondents were chosen to be “fairly evenly 
distributed in terms of their political affiliation”—a control measure that should not have been necessary if 
CBA really offered the objective policy advice that its more zealous adherents proclaim. Id. In the end, it is 
unclear what the researchers intended to contribute with the survey, except perhaps confirmation that many 
economists distrust federal agencies and the democratic process. Cf. id. at 907 (describing “one of [the 
authors’] wilder dreams” in which CBA is used to “make[e] each agency really sing for its supper”). 
82 See WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, MANAGING THE GLOBAL COMMONS: THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE 
CHANGE 184 (1994). For a discussion of how Monte Carlo procedures are used in toxic risk assessment, 
see Susan R. Poulter, Monte Carlo Procedures in Environmental Risk Assessment—Science, Policy and 
Legal Issues, 9 RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY & ENV. 7 (1998). 
83 See Judson Jaffe & Robert N. Stavins, The Value of Formal Quantitative Assessment of 
Uncertainty in Regulatory Analysis, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Analysis Related 
Publication 04-22 (Sept. 2004). 
84 A salient example from finance theory helps to elucidate this point. Reflecting their classical 
assumptions, conventional models of financial markets tend to deny the likelihood that stock market 
crashes will occur with the magnitude that we have, nonetheless, experienced on multiple occasions in the 
previous century. See BENOIT MANDELBROT & RICHARD L. HUDSON, THE (MIS)BEHAVIOR OF MARKETS 
(2004). This denial could be explained in one of two ways. On the one hand, we could be experiencing 
inconceivably bad luck during this period in our history such that later, when averaged over subsequent 
crash-free millennia, the infinitesimal risk predicted by Gaussian financial models will turn out to be 
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B. Catastrophe 
Criticisms of CBA’s efforts to grapple with complexity and uncertainty have 
particular purchase in the case of potentially catastrophic risks. As Judge Richard 
Posner’s recent book notes, humanity faces a number of threats of uncertain, but possibly 
monumental consequence, including some threats that might entail the erasure of all life 
on the planet.85 In the face of such complete catastrophic threats, conventional 
approaches to CBA would, first, sum up the total monetary-equivalent worth of the 
expected human population at the time of potential destruction and, second, discount that 
number, both for time and for likelihood.86 The resulting number would, of course, be 
finite. It might also be quite small, particularly if the anticipated disaster looms far in the 
future or with minute probability. One could increase the number to reflect a degree of 
risk aversion, but the result still would be finite and, if cost-benefit analyses of climate 
change are an indication,87 not alarmingly large. 
The question then arises whether the expectation calculus of CBA is appropriately 
textured for the type of decision actually being confronted. We have ruled out infinite 
values by assumption88 and our methodology devotes only indirect attention to variance, 
through the risk aversion adjustment. As a result, we have come to contemplate the “end 
                                                                                                                                                 
vindicated. On the other hand, it could be that our models are wrong and that, as Daniel Farber puts it, “it is 
reasonably foreseeable that non-reasonably foreseeable events will occur from time to time.” Farber, supra 
note __, at 146. 
85 See POSNER, CATASTROPHE, supra note __, at 20-21 (noting that “[t]he number of extreme 
catastrophes that have a more than negligible probability of occurring in this century is alarmingly great, 
and their variety startling”). 
86 Initially, one might expect that CBA would value an outcome of complete destruction at 
precisely zero, given that CBA tends to measure all welfare consequences from the perspective of 
individual preferences and, by assumption, no individuals would remain to express such preferences 
following an apocalyptic event. Cf. infra text accompanying notes 151-152 (observing that some CBA 
proponents argue present generations have no moral obligations at all with regard to future generations). As 
Matthew Adler has argued, however, death can be thought of as a welfare setback, even for the person who 
expires. See Adler, supra note __, at __-__. The thought project forces the analyst to determine whether 
utility is better assessed ex ante or ex post. In this case, given the hypothesized annihilation of all potential 
evaluators, only ex ante figures could be used. As Adler notes, economists in general tend to use ex ante 
preference assessments. See id. at __. Psychologists, on the other hand, find large and systematic deviations 
between the two assessment frames, raising in the process important questions about the nature of utility 
and well-being. See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN ET AL., WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC 
PSYCHOLOGY (1999). 
87 See Kysar Climate Change, supra note __. 
88 The tenets of rational choice theory break down when applied to gambles involving infinite 
value stakes. Most notably, the standard rationality assumption of continuity, which ensures that 
individuals can make tradeoffs between all relevant outcomes, is violated by the introduction of infinite 
utility outcomes. Scholars tend to respond to this complication either by developing entirely new 
formulations of decision theory that are capable of grappling with infinite utilities, or simply by ruling such 
utilities inadmissible in order to maintain the theoretical consistency of their framework. The former 
approach requires abandoning much of the conventional statistical approach to decisionmaking, including 
the laws of large numbers and, correspondingly, confidence that the concepts of expectation and risk 
aversion together provide a satisfactory guide for decisionmaking. The latter approach is obviously more 
theoretically tidy, but seems unacceptable so long as the idea of infinite values appears both meaningful 
and practically relevant to some actual decisions. 
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of life as we know it” with a soberness that might appear, to many, irrational. Unlike 
repeat-play monetary gambles, for which probabilistically-determined outcomes provide 
an invaluable source of information, expectation seems to provide a poor decision guide 
for irreversible or catastrophic events. Put bluntly, either nanotechnology will transform 
the planet into “gray goo” or it will not. We do not know what the precise probabilities 
involved are, but given the nature of discontinuity, we do know that the expected utility 
outcome—the weighted average of these extremes—will not occur.89 Thus, by displacing 
context-sensitive discussion of precisely what outcomes are being gambled in favor of 
what gains and for which winners and losers, the CBA approach tends to understate the 
challenge posed by long-term catastrophic risks. 
In light of such concerns, one might be tempted to carve out irreversible or 
catastrophic risks for special treatment, leaving CBA to serve as the predominant method 
for evaluating more routine environmental, health, and safety decisionmaking.90 The 
teachings of complexity theory, however, suggest that much of our understanding of 
“routine” risk regulation is misguided. The problem of irreversibility, for instance, should 
not be seen as restricted to one-shot disaster scenarios. Rather, given the presence of 
sensitivity, feedback loops, and other features of path dependence, some degree of 
irreversibility should be expected to characterize all decision nodes within complex 
adaptive systems.91 Indeed, if the teachings of complexity theory are sound, then 
environmental, health, and safety dilemmas will, almost by definition, present ill-posed 
problems that contain “nasty surprises”92 and other computationally intractable features. 
As the next Section explains, such features of complex, adaptive systems raise the 
possibility that pragmatic decisionmaking procedures such as the PP may prove more 
“ecologically rational” than formal analytical devices such as CBA. 
                                                 
89 As Posner notes, “by definition, all but the last doomsday prediction is false.” POSNER, 
CATASTROPHE, supra note __, at 13. The standard view of CBA defenders instead seems to be that, “We 
live in a continuous world.” Robert H. Frank, Why is Cost-Benefit Analysis So Controversial?, 29 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 77, 78 (2000). 
90 See Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Environment; Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible 
and Catastrophic. 
91 Sunstein argues further that irreversibilities should be seen to lie “on all sides” of the risk 
regulation equation, given that precautionary regulations may create their own irreversible effects, such as 
“increased dependence on nuclear energy” in the case of greenhouse gas mitigation policies. Sunstein, 
Irreversible and Catastrophic, supra note __, at 20. This argument appears to embrace the teachings of 
complexity theory, in the sense that systems such as the atmosphere or the regulated market are seen as 
likely to exhibit path dependency, feedback effects, and other tendencies toward irreversibility. Sunstein 
does not, however, engage the broader challenge posed by complexity theory to synoptic decisionmaking 
approaches such as CBA. Like the radical commensurability implications of the “risk-risk,” “health-
health,” and “environment-environment” arguments, see supra text accompanying notes 57-58, Sunstein’s 
“irreversibility-irreversibility” argument challenges far more than simply the conceptual underpinnings of 
the PP. It also problematizes the very basis on which moral decisionmaking gains traction, since it serves to 
erode the conceptions of distinctive human agency that underwrite a great deal of our moral reasoning and 
provide the fulcrum on which it ultimately depends. See infra text accompanying notes 210-224-. 
92 Farber, supra note __, at __. 
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C. Procedural Rationality 
In the context of complex, adaptive systems, the deliberate attempt to optimize 
may not represent simply an imperfect but useful aid to decisionmaking, as CBA 
defenders often assert.93 Rather, it may represent a solution concept that is poorly 
matched for the problem tasks at hand. In the face of ill-posed problems, we cannot 
confidently expect that the errors of CBA will cluster around an “optimal” result—
indeed, for such problems the very notion of an optimum eludes meaningful description. 
The errors of CBA therefore are capable of deviating substantially and unpredictably 
from decision paths that are easily identified as desirable—if not necessarily optimal—
through less formalistic decision procedures. In light of such concerns, proponents of the 
PP consciously part ways with the technocratic paradigm underlying risk assessment and 
CBA. Rather than insist on quantification as a predicate to decisionmaking,94 they instead 
argue that environmental, health, and safety regulation should become infused with a 
“culture of humility about the sufficiency and accuracy of existing knowledge.”95 
As it turns out, the United States has enjoyed a long and successful experience 
with precisely this approach. Despite the current prominence of CBA among U.S. 
policymakers and academics, much of U.S. environmental law and regulation continues 
to be based instead on policies and procedures that reflect a precautionary approach. In 
several key pollution control areas, for instance, the United States has forsaken 
optimization in favor of a precautionary practice of requiring installation of the best 
available pollution abatement technology,96 often with opt-out procedures extended to 
                                                 
93 See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR, supra note __, at 149 (defending CBA for its ability to 
“produce useful information” and “increase the coherence of programs that would otherwise be a product 
of some combination of fear, neglect and interest group power”); SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON, supra note 
__, at ix (“[C]ost-benefit analysis should be seen as a simple pragmatic tool, designed to promote better 
appreciation of the consequences of regulation.”); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE 
FUTURE OF REGULATORY PROTECTION 25-26 (2002) (“The strongest arguments for CBA seem to rest not 
with neoclassical economics but with common sense, informed by behavioral economics and cognitive 
psychology.”). 
94 Hahn and Malik are particularly stubborn on this point. After noting that many federal 
regulations offer benefits that have been left unquantified by adopting agencies, the authors first skeptically 
observe that “[t]he question naturally arises as to whether there are really benefits to those regulations.” 
Hahn & Malik, supra note __, at 895. Then, as part of their effort to assess the costs and benefits of major 
regulations, the authors simply assign “zero benefits” to those regulations for which benefits were left 
unquantified by the relevant agency. See id. at 898. To defend this procedure, Hahn and Malik state that 
“any other assumption seems totally arbitrary.” Id. But assigning zero is no more or less arbitrary than 
assigning any other number would be in this situation. Instead, what is truly arbitrary is insisting on a 
quantified value under circumstances in which quantification cannot reliably proceed. See Woodward & 
Bishop, supra note __, at 506 (arguing that “if the decision maker does not possess well-defined 
probabilities, then the use of ad hoc probabilities is not rational”). 
95 Stirling, supra note __, at 66. See also Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A 
Normative Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562 (1992). 
96 As Richard Stewart has noted, one frequently offered interpretation of the PP is that best 
available pollution technology requirements should be imposed on all proponents of activities with 
uncertain environmental, health, or safety threats. See Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulatory 
Decisionmaking Under Uncertainty, in 20 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 71, 78 (Timothy Swanson 
ed., 2002). 
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firms that are able to demonstrate achievement of equal abatement levels using 
alternative technologies.97 This simple heuristic—in essence, “do the best you can”98—
implies great collective commitment to the preservation of human life and the 
environment without requiring satisfaction of Herculean informational demands by 
regulators.99  
Realistic but unquantifiable threats of catastrophic loss present an additional case 
in which heuristic decisionmaking procedures may prove more pragmatically sensible 
than deliberate cost-benefit optimization. With regard to climate change, for instance, 
future generations may reflect with marvel on our present day attempts to meticulously 
calculate the costs and benefits of greenhouse policies. Such studies typically lead to a 
conclusion that the economic benefits of continued fossil fuel consumption more than 
outweigh the physical, agricultural, and ecological costs that would be averted by 
restricting emissions, at least for the next few decades. Accordingly, the optimal carbon 
reduction policy under CBA is a rather limited one that should not begin any time 
soon.100 The important lesson from complexity theory, again, is that the apparent CBA 
consensus on climate change may not merely be wrong; it may be wildly wrong. 
Especially in light of the relatively minor cost associated with implementing most 
                                                 
97 See Bodansky, The Precautionary Principle in US Environmental Law (1994). See also Adam 
Babich, Too Much Science in Environmental Law, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 119, 125 (2003) (“The 
requirement of best available technology embodies a policy judgment as attractive as apple pie.”); Thomas 
O. McGarity, The Goals of Environmental Legislation, 31 BOSTON COLLEGE ENVTL. AFFAIRS L. REV. 529, 
538-545 (2004) (reviewing examples); Wendy E. Wagner, The Triumph of Technology-Based Standards, 
2000 U. Ill. L. Rev. 83 (attributing much of the success of pollution reduction in the modern environmental 
era to technology-based standards); Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: 
Implementation of Uniform Standards and “Fine-Tuning” Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 
1283-84 (1985) (noting Congress repeatedly “chose to emphasize the need for prompt injury prevention 
over the need for an optimal balance between regulatory benefits and costs” in its landmark 1970s 
legislation). Significant early environmental court decisions also emphasized the precautionary basis of 
U.S. risk regulation. See Reserve Mining Co. v. E.P.A., 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975); Ethyl Corp. v. E.P.A., 
541 F.2d 1, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
98 See Wagner, supra note __, at 92. 
99 Moreover, in practice, the approach tends to produce results similar to those of a “knee of the 
cost curve” decisionmaking heuristic, in which pollution abatement is required at least to the point at which 
marginal returns from further abatement begin to steeply decline. See Thomas O. McGarity, The Internal 
Structure of EPA Rulemaking, 54 LAW & CONT. PROB. 57 (1991). In this manner, the “best available 
control technology” requirement demonstrates some cost-sensitivity (or proportionality) without depending 
on unrealistic and controversial assumptions regarding the ability of regulators to equalize the marginal 
costs and benefits of abatement. The policy standard instead assumes that the hazards of pollution are 
sufficiently severe and unpredictable that only the “best” effort at prevention will suffice. Such an 
aspirational standard should not be seen as reflecting a naïve belief in the possibility of a “zero risk” 
society. See W. Kip Viscusi, Equivalent Frames of Reference for Judging Risk Regulation Policies, 3 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 431, 465 (1995). Instead it reflects a sensitive appreciation both of the practical 
difficulties of crafting, defending, and enforcing pollution control standards, and of the deeply moral 
connotations that our legal pronouncements entail. See infra text accompanying notes 168-169 (discussing 
the “moral remainder” that accompanies the tragic choices entailed by risk regulation and that cannot be 
subsumed by the cost-benefit procedure). 
100 See LOMBORG, supra note __, at 318 (noting that “economic analyses clearly show that it will 
be far more expensive to cut CO2 emission radically than to pay the costs of adaptation to the increased 
temperatures”). 
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proposed carbon emissions abatement policies, uncertain but potentially catastrophic 
consequences of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions should not simply be reduced 
to an expectation value and included within cost-benefit calculation.101 
Along these lines, a growing number of scientists and policymakers have begun to 
focus attention on the stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations at a level that is 
hoped to be sufficiently low to eliminate the possibility of truly disastrous climate change 
scenarios.102 By advocating the limitation of human emissions to a point that will avoid 
exceeding this critical level whatever the cost, proponents eschew optimization and 
instead adopt something more closely resembling the “safe minimum standards” 
approach that is familiar from the economic literature on endangered species 
regulation.103 Recognizing that climate change, like species preservation, is characterized 
by uncertainty, irreversibilities, critical thresholds, and other hallmark features of 
complexity, proponents argue that society should establish “safe minimum standards . . . 
for protecting Earth’s life-support systems in the face of virtually inevitable unpleasant 
surprises.”104  
This “safe minimum standards” approach has long been associated with the PP.105 
One also may think of the “safe minimum standards” approach as resembling the 
maximin principle from decision theory, which counsels minimization of the maximum 
possible loss when decisionmakers are faced with policy choices that are characterized by 
true uncertainty.106 Most famously discussed by John Rawls in the context of elaborating 
an egalitarian theory of justice,107 the maximin principle reflects what would be termed 
an extreme degree of risk aversion if probabilistic information on outcomes were actually  
available, given that the principle focuses attention exclusively on the worst case 
outcome from each possible course of action under inspection. For this reason, the 
principle has attracted a substantial share of criticism.108 Nevertheless, at least as a 
                                                 
101 See Kysar, Climate Change, supra note __.  
102 See id. 
103 Richard C. Bishop, Endangered Species And Uncertainty: The Economics Of A Safe Minimum 
Standard, AM. J. AGRICULTURE ECON. 10 (Feb., 1978); S.V. CIRIACY-WANTRUP, RESOURCE 
CONSERVATION: ECONOMICS AND POLICIES (1st ed., 1952). See also Barton H. Thompson, Jr., People or 
Prairie Chickens: The Uncertain Case for Optimal Biodiversity, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1159-63 (1999) 
(reviewing and critiquing the “safe minimum standards” literature). 
104 Paul R. Ehrlich, Ecological Economics and the Carrying Capacity of the Earth, in NATURAL 
CAPITAL: THE ECOLOGICAL APPROACH TO SUSTAINABILITY 38, 49 (A. Jansson, M. Hammer, C. Folke, & 
Robert Costanza, eds., 1994). 
105 See T.M. Crowards, Combining Economics, Ecology and Philosophy: Safe Minimum Standards 
of Environmental Protection, in VALUATION AND ENVIRONMENT: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES (M. 
O’Connor & C. Spash, eds., 1997); O’Riordan, Jordan & Cameron, supra note __, at 23. 
106 Indeed, as Sunstein notes, the maximin principle shares much conceptual space with the PP, 
given that both principles direct “officials to identify the worst case among the various options, and to 
select that option whose worst case is least bad.” Sunstein, supra note __, at 1033. 
107 But see Derek Parfit & John Broome, Rawlsian Principles, in DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND 
PERSONS 490-493 (1984) (observing an important, but subtle conceptual distinction between Rawls’s 
difference principle and maximin). 
108 See John C. Harsanyi, Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of 
John Rawls’s Theory, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 594 (1975). Much of this criticism, however, overlooks the 
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preliminary stance, proponents of the PP believe that an extreme level of risk aversion is 
appropriate for policymaking that concerns unknown but potentially devastating threats 
to the global climate, the ozone layer, biodiversity, and other natural systems that are 
thought to be of fundamental and irreplaceable importance to humanity. 
Whether characterized as the PP, the best available technology requirement, the 
safe minimum standard, or the maximin principle, each of these related decisionmaking 
techniques reflects an awareness that truly rational risk regulation sometimes requires 
officials to abandon the quest for optimization in favor of less ambitious, more 
pragmatically sensible approaches. Of course, the extreme conservatism of these 
approaches begs the questions of when and how to relax their dictates in favor of more 
permissive standards. According to many PP supporters, however, fostering such an 
adaptive approach to risk regulation is precisely the point of the PP—something that the 
principle’s critics seem reluctant to acknowledge. Unlike the optimization framework of 
CBA, which must resort to awkward analytical devices in the presence of imperfectly 
characterized risks, the PP’s incremental approach reflects great sensitivity to the fact that 
effective decisionmaking in the face of many problems demands procedural 
rationality.109 
The policymaking paradigm of “adaptive management” often is seen as a natural 
candidate to provide the kind of incremental, dynamic decisionmaking procedure 
envisioned by PP proponents.110 Pioneered by biologist C.S. Holling,111 adaptive 
management is an application of “the concept of experimentation to the design and 
implementation of natural-resource and environmental policies.”112 Because uncertainty 
and evolutionary change are presumed to be foundational characteristics of both 
biophysical and sociolegal systems, the adaptive management approach does not seek to 
identify static “optimal” equilibria. Instead, it aims to utilize constant feedback and 
                                                                                                                                                 
conditions that Rawls presupposed for appropriate use of the maximin principle: settings of true uncertainty 
involving a worst-case outcome of “grave risks” which could be avoided by sacrificing a potential gain that 
is of comparatively insubstantial moment. PP proponents believe that current environmental policy issues 
such as climate change fit these conditions well. See supra text accompanying notes 101-104. 
109 See BRIAN J. LOASBY, CHOICE, COMPLEXITY AND IGNORANCE: AN ENQUIRY INTO ECONOMIC 
THEORY AND THE PRACTICE OF DECISION-MAKING 220 (1976) (“A theory which takes serious account of 
time and ignorance must be a theory of processes, not of states—and not even of dynamic states.”); 
Schrader-Frechette, supra note __, at 27 (“Decision-theoretic rules under uncertainty require scientists to 
take account of the fairness of the allocation process, not merely the outcomes.”). 
110 See A. Dan Tarlock, Is There A There There In Environmental Law?, 19 J. LAND USE & 
ENVTL. L. 213, 252 (2004) (“The precautionary principle needs to be linked to the idea of adaptive 
management. The existence of monitoring and adaptive feed-back mechanisms should be a major factor in 
validating the decision to limit an activity when the adverse impacts are uncertain.”). 
111 See ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT (C.S. Holling ed., 1978).   
112 See KAI N. LEE, COMPASS AND GYROSCOPE 53 (1993). See also JOHN COPELAND NAGLE & J.B. 
RUHL, THE LAW OF BIODIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT (2002); Norman L. Christensen, The 
Report of the Ecological Society of America Committee on the Scientific Basis for Ecosystem Management, 
6 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 665 (1996) (describing ecosystem management as “driven by explicit goals, 
executed by policies, protocols, and practices, and made adaptable by monitoring and research based on our 
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experimentation in order to ensure the long-run sustainability of vital ecological 
processes. The concept of sustainability, in turn, entails judgments that cross not only the 
boundaries between scientific disciplines, but also the real and imagined boundaries that 
exist between science and politics.113 The ultimate aim of adaptive management, 
therefore, is the rather grandiose one of “integrat[ing] scientific knowledge of ecological 
relationships within a complex sociopolitical and values framework toward the general 
goal of protecting native ecosystem integrity over the long term” 114 
As part of this “complex sociopolitical and values framework”, proponents 
believe that the PP can play a central information-forcing role. Unlike their CBA 
counterparts, proponents of the PP recognize that uncertainty itself is a subject of power, 
influence, and control within economically advanced societies. Thus, the content of 
scientific knowledge and the manner of its production are not treated exogenously by the 
PP, but instead are made a central focus of the regulatory program. Shifting the burden of 
proof onto the promoters of new technologies and activities, as many proponents of the 
PP urge, serves the practical purpose of providing incentives for research and 
understanding by those parties who are thought to be best able to develop knowledge of 
imperfectly characterized threats.115 The CBA/risk assessment paradigm, in contrast, 
seems to assume that scientific uncertainty—the single most salient feature of 
environmental, health, and safety regulation—is simply addressed “out there.”116 There 
are great opportunity costs to such epistemic bravado, for the regulatory approval process 
itself can offer a powerful institutional mechanism for reducing the scientific 
uncertainties that riddle environmental, health, and safety law.117 
                                                                                                                                                 
best understanding of the ecological interactions and processes necessary to sustain ecosystem composition, 
structure, and function”).  
113 See Kysar, Sustainable Development, supra note __. 
114 R. Edward Grumbine, What is Ecosystem Management?, 8 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 27, 31 
(1994). 
115 See Amy Sinden, Cass Sunstein’s Cost-Benefit Lite: Economics for Liberals, 29 COLUM. J. 
ENVTL. L. 191, 194 (2004) (observing that precautionary regulatory approaches such as absolute standards 
“perform a crucial power-shifting function, leveling the political playing field between diffuse and 
powerless public interests and concentrated monied corporate interests”). 
116 Cf. Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law to Produce 
Needed Information on Health and the Environment, 53 DUKE L. J. 1619 (2004) (criticizing “the failure of 
environmental laws to require production of basic information about the harms caused by polluting 
activities and hazardous products”).  
117 No doubt, proponents of optimization would protest that uncertainties exist on both the risk and 
benefit sides of such dilemmas. Market actors, however, already have strong incentives to demonstrate (and 
to capture) the benefits of their activities and technologies. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking 
Behavioralism Seriously:  A Response to Market Manipulation, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 259 (2000). 
In that sense, the PP’s asymmetry of regulatory concern can be seen as responding to an underlying 
asymmetry of knowledge incentives within the unregulated market. 
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II. THE PROBLEM OF VALUATION 
As Gödel famously demonstrated, no formal system of minimal complexity can 
be both consistent and complete.118 Because consistency generally is taken to capture the 
essence of rationality, practitioners of CBA respond to Gödel’s challenge by sacrificing 
completeness in their formal analytical framework; that is, they treat certain decision 
criteria as externally given in order to maintain the consistency of their CBA outputs.119 
Thus, despite the widespread view that CBA encompasses a broader range of concerns 
than the PP, it is only the CBA procedure that must—by its very nature—ignore at least 
some parameters of a given decisionmaking context. Practitioners of CBA generally 
attempt to minimize this complication by exogenizing elements that are thought to be of 
little practical import or that are believed to be adequately addressed by other institutional 
mechanisms. The problem with this otherwise sensible strategy is that, increasingly, CBA 
is being offered for use in choice settings where the variables exogenized are of deep and 
unmistakable significance to the very decision under inspection, and where the potential 
role of alternative governance mechanisms is being displaced by the CBA exercise itself.  
 
As described in the previous Part, especially troubling in their exclusion are 
questions concerning how the relevant political community should behave in the face of 
uncertainty regarding potentially irreversible or catastrophic consequences of human 
action. Equally troublesome are questions concerning, first, how the political community 
should respond to the fact that not only private values, but also social meanings 
sometimes are affected by new technologies, shared experiences, or collective 
decisionmaking processes; and, second, how the community should regard non-nationals, 
future generations, and other interest-holders that are not already granted full membership 
in the community of individuals who supply the raw material for the interest-optimization 
calculus. Both of these sets of questions require mechanisms for fostering democratic 
dialogue and developing new collective norms of responsibility. Yet, as this Part 
demonstrates, the questions are subtly taken by CBA as having already been answered—
an approach that might not be so worrisome if the answers presumed were not so 
confused and misleading. 
 
A. Emergence 
CBA practitioners conventionally adopt a preferentialist account of welfare in 
which individuals’ revealed or hypothesized preferences are taken to supply the exclusive 
criterion for valuing the expected consequences of social choice. Yet, as Mark Sagoff has 
argued, CBA practitioners have no non-normative procedure for deriving individual 
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preference functions.120 That is, despite the oft-heard claim that revealed preference 
studies represent “in fact reflections of individual preferences, and hence utility,”121 the 
interpretation of observed behavior is actually a slippery exercise in which the analyst 
must adopt a series of assumptions about the available opportunities and choice criteria 
that confront observed individuals. At times, these assumptions appear to rest more on 
personal introspection and professional custom than on sustained engagement with the 
actual circumstances of observed individuals. As Sagoff puts it, “[c]hoice is at best a 
conceptual construct inferred from ad hoc descriptions of behavior—descriptions that 
themselves presuppose beliefs about available options and therefore about 
preferences.”122 
To give one pertinent example, many of the data problems found in controversial 
employment market value-of-life studies—which provide empirical estimates for use in 
policymaking of individuals’ willingness-to-pay to avoid risks of death or injury to 
themselves—arise from the fact that the United States has managed to drastically reduce 
its occupational hazard levels over the course of the past century. For this reason, the 
remaining segments of the economy that exhibit an occupational mortality rate high 
enough to support the wage-risk premium methodology tend to be segments populated by 
those with the least social, economic, and political capital—variables that themselves can 
be expected to influence the opportunity set and the resulting preference orderings of 
observed individuals.123 Thus, what the CBA analyst regards as choice (and hence 
preference (and hence utility)), may actually better capture the analyst’s own inclination 
to treat pre-existing power relations in employment markets as normatively privileged.124 
Further room for normative confusion under CBA arises from the counterfactual 
nature of opportunity cost assessment. Not only are CBA values typically derived from 
debatable preference elicitation procedures, but they also are chosen from a class of 
foregone benefits that tends to be bounded only by the analyst’s imagination.125 In such 
                                                 
120 See SAGOFF, PRICE, PRINCIPLE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note __, at 57-79. 
121 W. Kip Viscusi, Risk Equity, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 843, 849 (2000) (emphasis added). Compare 
Amartya Sen, Rational Fools, in CHOICE, WELFARE, AND MEASUREMENT 84-106 (1982). 
122 SAGOFF, supra note __, at 77.  
123 According to one study, for instance, the implicit value-of-life revealed by wage-risk 
interactions appears to be several million dollars higher for union workers than for non-union workers, 
holding constant other significant variables. See Peter Dorman & Paul Hagstron, Wage Compenation for 
Dangerous Work Revisited, 52 INDUSTRY & LABOR RELATIONS REV. 116, 133 (1998). See also W. Kip 
Viscusi, Risk Equity, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 843 (2000); ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note __, at 79; 
SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK:  RESTORING A PRAGMATIC 
APPROACH 99-100 (2003). 
124 Indeed, whether or not preferentialist in form, the reference case for defining and measuring 
welfare consequences of social choice tends to remain unequivocally focused on the status quo under CBA. 
See, e.g., U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., DRAFT ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL HABITAT DESIGNATION 
FOR THE RIO GRANDE SILVERY MINNOW, FINAL DRAFT (May 2002), cited in Sinder, supra note __, at 169-
170 (“The standard best practice in economic analysis is applying an approach that measures costs, 
benefits, and other impacts arising from a regulatory action against a baseline scenario of the world without 
the regulation.”). 
125 Cf. James M. Buchanan, Introduction: L.S.E. Cost Theory in Retrospect, in L.S.E. ESSAYS ON 
COST 1, 15 (James M. Buchanan & G.F. Thirlby eds., 1981) (“[T]he opportunity cost involved in choice 
  27
circumstances, the line between modeling and manipulating becomes a fine one. In one 
prominent study of climate change, for instance, the analyst’s decision to add a variable 
representing enhanced recreation opportunities in a warmer world resulted in monetized 
benefits that tended to swamp the impact of estimated morbidity and mortality.126 Apart 
from being unduly wooden—why assume, after all, that individuals will continue to value 
mountain biking at the same amount if they know that their extra days of recreation have 
been funded through an increase in malaria among the equatorial poor?—this exercise 
also is open to considerable error and abuse. In a real sense, climate change has the 
potential to affect every biophysical and sociolegal system on the planet, systems about 
which our present understanding is highly incomplete and imperfect. To select among 
such effects and portray the resulting calculation as objective is convincing only because 
the ritual comports with our deeply ingrained desire to avoid the specter of openly 
collective decisionmaking. 
This is not to suggest that the analyst could, even in theory, conduct a 
thoroughgoing preferentialist account of climate change. The degrees of uncertainty in 
the relevant parameters—and the degrees of freedom available to the cost-benefit analyst 
in choosing which aspects of which systems to hold constant—render the project fanciful. 
Nor is it merely a problem of adopting preferentialism as the relevant welfare criterion. 
The problem instead lies with any form of methodological individualism. Just as certain 
attributes and behaviors of complex, adaptive biophysical systems cannot be predicted by 
examining individual system components alone, certain values and aims of the “social 
organism”127 cannot be identified or predicted through the simple aggregation of 
atomized preferences or interests.128 Instead, those values and aims in part emerge 
through the operation of social institutions and procedures themselves. As Laurence Tribe 
observes, “the whole point of personal or social choice in many situations is not to 
implement a given system of values in light of the perceived facts, but rather to define, 
and sometimes deliberately to reshape, the values—and hence the identity—of the 
individual or community that is engaged in the process of choosing.”129  
Collective procedures of this nature tend to be seen as illiberal or paternalistic. It 
is true, of course, that “if regulators reject people’s actual judgments, then they are 
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insulting their dignity.”130 Yet there is insult also in attributing meaning and significance 
to behavior that individuals themselves may not desire or intend. For many pressing 
environmental and risk regulation issues, individual preferences are likely to be non-
existent or ill-formed in the absence of an appropriate forum for discussing and 
determining social goals. For instance, simply toting up the “revealed” preferences of 
individuals regarding the myriad potential consequences of cloning livestock for human 
consumption131 seems, at least at present, to be an incurably contrived exercise. We will 
not know our preferences with respect to cloned livestock unless and until we have a 
body of relevant experience from which to draw upon in our evaluations. Such 
experience will only occur with the prior consent of our political community, whether 
actively or passively granted. Thus, except perhaps as a method of curtailing collective 
debate, it makes little sense at present to hinge policies regarding cloned livestock on our 
imagined preferences. 
The deliberative deficit of methodological individualism is also evident in Judge 
Posner’s recent use of CBA to suggest that the optimal post-Katrina reconstruction plan 
for New Orleans is one in which “the historic portions of the city (the French Quarter and 
the Garden District) might be rebuilt and preserved as a tourist site, much like Colonial 
Williamsburg, without having to be part of a city.”132 Posner may well be right that the 
United States should not spend billions of dollars reconstructing New Orleans to its 
former scale, especially in light of projected sea level rises over the next century from 
climate change that would transform the city into an island. But the reason for this 
conclusion is not to be found in a CBA premised on the decontextualized preferences of 
individuals. Whatever pre-Katrina tourist behavior might suggest (for it is their 
disposable dollars that presumably are driving the conclusion that only the French 
Quarter and the Garden District are worth rebuilding), it is an open question whether 
individuals post-Katrina agree that they have little use for a revival of the Ninth Ward 
and other poor, racially-segregated areas of the city. To say nothing of the deeper issues 
of environmental justice raised by the Katrina tragedy, we insult the role of citizenship 
when we assume that shared experiences do not affect the preferences that we hold and 
the meanings that we attribute to our social world. 
B. Membership 
In addition to denying a view of social choice as anything other than an 
aggregation of existing interests, CBA also begins with the assumption that all relevant 
interest-holders have been identified for purposes of aggregation. In many instances, 
however, environmental policymaking will be concerned precisely with determining 
which interest-holders are entitled to membership in the political community, and on 
what basis their interests are to be considered.133 One long-recognized example concerns 
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the appropriate stance toward animals and other non-human life forms.134 As this Section 
explains, certain other categories of interest-holders that are of special concern to 
environmental policymaking—including statistical victims, non-nationals, and members 
of future generations—find themselves ignored or devalued by the CBA procedure in 
ways that are inadequately defended. This is not to say that the precautionary approach 
provides more clear or appropriate guidance as to how to resolve the ethical and political 
issues raised by these missing interest-holders. The PP approach does, however, 
explicitly recognize the need for development of new norms of national, global, and 
intergenerational environmental responsibility. In contrast, CBA seems to offer the 
implicit message that our intellectual needs consist only of better data and more rigorous 
techniques of valuation.135 
CBA’s deficits in this regards are well demonstrated by the procedure’s treatment 
of consent to environmental risks. As noted above, CBA proponents view labor market 
revealed preference studies as a sufficient basis for assuming individualized consent to 
the imposition of all manner of health and safety risks, a belief that in turn leads them to 
argue that CBA does not involve human life or health at all, but instead only the 
“monetary equivalents” of such values.136 To the extent that they recognize the analytical 
leap implicit in this argument, proponents of CBA defend the leap by noting that most 
human health risks from environmental hazards are quite small and, thus, officials safely 
can assume that individuals would consent to the risks for a price comparable to the 
implicit value of life that is derived from the wage-risk premium literature.137 Not only 
does this defense fail to grapple with the fact that individual responses to even actuarially 
identical risks vary dramatically based on the risks’ qualitative characteristics,138 but it 
also ignores the fact that a variety of adverse health risks associated with pollution and 
other hazards are not trivially small.139 To abstract away from such qualitative and 
quantitative features of risk in search of a uniform clearing price for life is to deny the 
profundity of collective decisionmaking regarding institutionalized harm. 
CBA’s limitations in this regard again seem to be driven by the procedure’s 
purely individualistic conception of value. Without an identity—and therefore without a 
                                                 
134 See generally ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS (Cass R. Sunstein & 
Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2005). 
135 See Lisa Heinzerling, Knowing Killing and Environmental Law, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 521 
(2006). 
136 See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 537, 538 (2005). 
137 See Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Environment, supra note __, at 25 (“In many cases 
of environmental regulation . . . rights violations are not involved; we are speaking here of statistically 
small risks.”). 
138 For a recent and probing survey of issues related to the project of better “individuating” 
monetary values of statistical lives, see Cass R. Sunstein, Valuing Life: A Plea for Disaggregation, 54 
DUKE L. J. 385 (2004). 
139 See, e.g., Anne Rajotte, Asthma and Pesticides in Public Schools: Does the ADA Provide a 
Remedy Where FIFRA Fails to Protect?, 31 BOSTON COLLEGE ENVTL. AFFAIRS L. REV. 149 (2004) (noting 
that childhood asthma rates have doubled over the past century, with 4.8 million children presently 
affected, and that “[e]nvironmentally-related exacerbation is estimated to account for one third of 
childhood asthma cases”). 
  30
willingness or even an ability to pay for protection—those lives that are threatened by 
statistical risks seem not to represent human lives at all. Statistical risks, however, 
represent “none of us” and “all of us” at once.140 Because CBA refuses to see “all of us” 
as an interest-holder, it is incapable of treating environmental, health, and safety 
regulation with the moral richness that the subject deserves. As Lisa Heinzerling notes, 
by pricing human life and sanctioning actions that place it in jeopardy in advance of their 
occurrence, “the most basic kind of right—the right to be protected from physical harm 
caused by other people, on equal terms with other people—is denied to those whose lives 
are framed in statistical terms.”141 Rather than begin with a wholesale level of presumed 
consent to the imposition of risk, the PP instead begins with a strong entitlement to bodily 
integrity and ecological support, and a corresponding duty on the part of others to avoid 
causing serious or irreparable harm to those interests. Difficult questions of 
implementation and exception are immediately raised, but the baseline normative 
condition under the PP remains one of sanctity for human life, not vulnerability. 
A similar tenuousness characterizes the position of non-nationals and other 
currently living individuals who stand outside of the particular political community that 
engages in a CBA policymaking exercise. After all, one cannot readily conduct a CBA to 
determine whether and how the interests of such individuals should be counted for 
purposes of conducting CBA.142 Yet a great deal of environmental policymaking and the 
pursuit of sustainable development is bound up precisely with the challenge of perceiving 
and respecting the interests of globally dispersed populations—populations that, despite 
their political dispersion, nonetheless share elaborate networks of ecological and 
economic interdependence.143 Increasingly, private individuals are being asked by 
international environmental norm entrepreneurs to express regard and concern for the 
social and environmental conditions of other nations.144 The state, however, remains the 
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critical geopolitical actor for most of environmental law and regulation and, thus, any 
policy framework such as CBA that struggles to address extrajurisdictional effects cannot 
be regarded as a comprehensive solution to environmental policymaking.145 
Finally, and most importantly, CBA’s framework struggles to acknowledge future 
generations as interest-holders in themselves, rather than merely as objects of valuation 
by the presently living. Scholars have long acknowledged the theoretical difficulties for 
moral and political philosophy presented by the topic of intergenerational justice,146 many 
of which arise again from the fact that our bedrock normative theories tend to be liberal-
individualistic in form. Like children, future generations are part of the “Achilles’ Heel of 
liberalism”147—that vulnerable location for interest holders who are imperfectly situated 
to identify and assert their rights or interests in the manner that liberalism demands of 
them. Future generations are especially burdened in this regard, for not only are they non-
existent, but they also are cognitively obscured even to those presently living, given 
liberalism’s tendency to adopt one or another form of methodological individualism. 
These limitations are well-demonstrated by what Derek Parfit has termed the non-
identity problem: the fact that whatever policy is selected for a given issue may affect the 
very identity of future individuals.148 The non-identity problem is related to, but distinct 
from, the problem of endogenous preferences, in which environmental policy is 
recognized to have profound effects on the preferences of individuals (including even 
previously identified preferences that may have been used to determine the content of 
environmental policy).149 In the intergenerational context, it is not merely that 
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individuals’ preferences shift as a result of policy choices, but that their very existence is 
made contingent on our choices. In such circumstances, we cannot say that future 
individuals will be made better or worse off by a policy choice, only that they will be 
made. 
To the student of complexity theory, this problem of contingent identity is quickly 
recognized as a manifestation of the profound endogeneity and interconnectedness of 
complex adaptive systems; to the cost-benefit analyst, on the other hand, the problem 
appears fundamentally disruptive. Indeed, as Parfit notes, the non-identity problem poses 
deep conceptual challenges to any theory of normative ethics that is framed in terms of 
the rights, preferences, or interests of particular individuals.150 Such “person-affecting” 
normative theories provide little analytical traction in decisionmaking contexts where the 
relevant consequences will be felt by entirely different persons depending on how the 
decision is resolved. As a result, for such dilemmas, our moral thinking at present is 
highly immature. It has, for instance, led to the conclusions that we have no obligations to 
future generations whatsoever,151 or that we have only an obligation to ensure that our 
choices leave future generations with lives that are minimally worth living.152  
In order to avoid such unattractive conclusions, Parfit argues that we need to 
move beyond simple “appeal to what is good or bad for those people whom our acts 
affect,” and instead to begin developing methods of evaluating “different sets of possible 
lives.”153 One promising mechanism for doing so is to conceive of the “communities 
which future generations belong to [as] deserving of concern and respect in their own 
right.”154 As discussed in Part III, the PP promotes just such a conception by establishing 
a standard of agent-relative environmental responsibility, in which human societies and 
generations are seen as distinct moral agents that stand in relations of responsibility and 
indebtedness to each other. Through such a partial concession to communitarianism, we 
can begin to harmonize our liberal individualistic ideals with the reality that some 
measure of paternalism and coercion is simply inescapable vis a vis future generations 
and other members of liberalism’s Achilles’ Heal. 
CBA proponents instead try to dodge this dilemma through the use of an elaborate 
mathematical fiction—the discount rate. Although a full discussion of the use of 
discounting in the intergenerational policy context is beyond the scope of this Article,155 
the practice does deserve brief mention because the effect of discounting future costs and 
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benefits to a present value tends to swamp all other variables within long-term CBA.156 
Of the various normative justifications that have been offered for the use of discounting, 
the most substantively significant is based on the idea that, unless future costs and 
benefits are discounted according to a rate that reflects the return on investment offered 
by alternative uses of public funds, society will fail to maximize its welfare over time. 
Thus, the reduction of future consequences to a present value is thought to ensure that 
policymakers will remain mindful of the opportunity costs of regulation, a practice that is 
said to be temporally neutral because it leads to the overall maximization of social 
welfare, however that welfare happens to be distributed across time. 
This conventional justification for the use of discounting within CBA seriously 
falters when policymaking includes intergenerational effects, for the very values that are 
to be discounted depend on the specification of a background distribution of rights and 
responsibilities, and much of environmental law and policy is concerned directly with 
establishing that background distribution across generations.157 Thus, we should reject the 
contention that “the debate over intergenerational equity should be separated from the 
debate over discounting.”158 Through discounting, the fundamental issue of 
intergenerational equity—which risks and resources, as an ethical matter, should be 
imposed or bestowed on future generations?—is conflated with the issue of 
intergenerational efficiency—which generation, as a technical matter based on a given 
rate of discount and distribution of resource entitlements, does or will derive more utility 
from the use of a given resource? Future generations, in essence, are forced to “outbid” 
present owners by an amount reflecting not only the strength of their needs, but also the 
alternative uses to which all resources—including the “monetary equivalents” of their 
own lives—could be put during the intervening time periods. This is conceptual 
confusion. 
C. Discursive Rationality 
As noted above,159 the contention of PP proponents that environmental, health, 
and safety decisionmaking is characterized by abiding uncertainty does not commit them 
to the extreme conservatism of the maximin approach as a general or permanent 
response. Rather, the PP is intended to commence a program of risk regulation that is 
both proportionate to the scope of the perceived threat and capable of being updated and 
adjusted over time. Proponents of the safe minimum standards approach within 
environmental economics also tend to qualify their position, arguing that fidelity to safe 
minimum standards should yield when the costs of precaution become “immoderate”160 
or “unacceptably large.”161 Within the legal literature, Dan Farber similarly allows for 
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departure from his strong “environmental baseline” approach to policymaking “when 
costs would clearly overwhelm any potential benefits” from precautionary regulation.162 
Although critics sometimes argue that these various safety valves suggest a latent 
efficiency criterion within the precautionary approach,163 there are important distinctions 
that prevent the PP from collapsing into CBA, even granting the addition of some form of 
cost sensitivity. To begin with, the PP’s understanding of cost is much broader than the 
notion presupposed by CBA.164 As Bishop wrote in a seminal article on the safe 
minimum standards approach to endangered species protection, the determination of 
“[h]ow much [cost] is ‘unacceptably large’ must necessarily involve more than economic 
analysis, because endangered species involve issues of intergenerational equity.”165 
Similarly, advocates of the PP typically contemplate an inclusive process for making 
determinations about how to apply the principle, suggesting that the decision to relax its 
dictates can and should be premised on a range of appropriate reasons beyond simple 
welfare-maximization.166 Given the momentous and context-specific ethical implications 
of such determinations, PP proponents are simply unwilling to replace considered, 
democratic judgments with mechanical devices such as risk aversion or option value 
premiums. Instead, such judgments are seen as unavoidably contingent and case-
specific.167 
There is a deeper problem, as well. Even if mechanical devices of the kind sought 
by CBA proponents could be identified, the cost-benefit procedure still would fail to 
register the sense of regret that accompanies risk regulation’s tragic choices and that 
compels more searching inspection of how to design a society in which such choices are 
not as starkly and pervasively posed.168 Lives lost under the “do the best you can” 
heuristic and other precautionary approaches are not viewed as efficient “tradeoffs,” 
blithely accepted in exchange for whatever utility has been gained. Instead, they are 
viewed as tragic, regrettable consequences of human fallibility and finitude—a “moral 
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164 See Communication from the Commission, supra note __, at 19 (“Examination of the pros and 
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165 Bishop, supra note __. 
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29 J. LEGAL STUD. 169 (2000). 
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remainder”169 that provides enduring motivation for surviving members of society to seek 
ways of doing better in the future. In contrast, because it aspires to comprehensive 
rationality, CBA must invariably round this moral remainder to zero and, thus, it must 
fail to encourage an appropriate degree of self-awareness regarding the deep normativity 
of risk regulation. 
A key benefit of the PP, in contrast, is that it contains a built-in sensitivity to the 
need for collective deliberation. Even if we know that the PP’s more severe implications 
will need to be relaxed, the principle nevertheless forces societal discussion regarding the 
normative status of statistical victims, other societies, and future generations.170 In that 
regard, the PP’s insistence that human health and the environment deserve constant, 
anticipatory attention serves as a procedural lever for furthering still-nascent attempts to 
reason through important questions that lie at the “frontiers of justice”—questions about 
our responsibilities to members of other nations, other generations, and other species.171 
Such an approach therefore aspires not only to be procedurally rational (e.g., in the sense 
that dynamic, incremental management approaches are demanded in the face of 
complexity and uncertainty in biophysical and sociolegal systems172), but also to be 
discursively rational (e.g., in the sense that it helps to structure and promote collective 
deliberation regarding decisions for which our existing, individualized preferences are 
either ill-formed or ill-suited for the decision under inspection). 
Of course, the PP’s desire to encourage inclusive and robust deliberation may not 
easily comport with its desire to allow flexible, dynamic regulatory processes. As J.B. 
Ruhl has observed, adaptive management may well be inconsistent with traditional 
administrative law mechanisms for ensuring robust public participation in regulatory 
decisionmaking.173 Moreover, some proponents of adaptive management appear to 
envision an expansive normative role for the experts who are placed in charge of 
ecosystem management.174 Thus, whether by dint of a mismatch between adaptive 
                                                 
169 Markovits, supra note __, at 231. See also Calabresi & Bobbit, supra note __, at 32 (referring 
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management and the cumbersome processes of public participation, or by dint of an 
increasing willingness among experts to inject their normative views into the 
management process itself, the goals of procedural and discursive rationality may well be 
in tension with each other, even on the more populist-oriented precautionary approach. A 
critical task for environmental law going forward, therefore, is to identify an appropriate 
division of labor between expert adaptive managers and the broader political community 
that enlists their aid in the pursuit of sustainable development. 
III. THE PROBLEM OF AGENCY 
 
 
At bottom, the distinction between CBA and the PP reflects a distinction between 
agent-neutral and agent-relative conceptions of risk regulation. CBA aspires to achieve 
complete agent-neutrality at the level of the political community by disclaiming the 
relevance of any normative considerations beyond the welfare impacts of regulatory 
decisions on individual members of the community. Collective values or aims, in other 
words, play no role in the CBA exercise. As Parts I and II demonstrate, however, CBA 
must resort to controversial assumptions and exclusions in order to maintain the 
perception that morally discretionary choices are not being made within its framework, 
apart from the foundational choice to fix collective decisionmaking upon the aggregation 
of individual welfare consequences.  
 
Indeed, as an indication of the degree of confusion in this area, some CBA 
proponents even attempt to deny that individual welfare maximization is a moral choice 
at all. They state, for instance, that their analysis of “risk equity will not be from the 
standpoint of moral criteria but rather social welfare maximization.”175 Similarly, they 
express a belief that “the moral debates [over discounting in the intergenerational policy 
context] can be bracketed by investigating people’s actual preferences in this domain.”176 
The analyst wants to reassure herself that she is merely conduct a “technical” and 
“objective” task of identifying and tabulating welfare consequences of policymaking, but 
any effort to actually define, construct, and implement a social welfare function entails 
extraordinarily difficult normative—and political—judgments. The dichotomy of fairness 
versus welfare only arises after the analyst has first defined welfare using criteria of 
justice . . . and fairness.  
 
These are familiar debates. As this Part observes, however, there is an even more 
fundamental problem with CBA’s attempt to disclaim its own normativity. By 
analogizing from the metaethical construction of individual moral agency, this Part 
                                                                                                                                                 
judgments.”). Others argue that the fact-value distinction, however philosophically troubled, must remain 
nominally intact in order to ensure the professional authority and deference accorded to scientists. See R.T. 
Lackey, Seven Pillars of Ecosystem Management, 40 LANDSCAPE & URBAN PLANNING 21 (1998) 
(“Ecosystem management should maintain ecosystems in the appropriate condition to achieve desired 
social benefits; the desired social benefits are defined by society, not scientists.”). 
175 Viscusi, supra note __, at 844. 
176 Sunstein & Rowell, supra note __, at 5. 
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suggests that CBA’s project may ultimately be self-undermining in that it serves to erase 
the kinds of conceptual distinctions that are necessary in order to preserve the sense that a 
political community should engage in decisionmaking of any sort. That is, because an 
essential premise of CBA is that collective choice should passively and impartially trace 
the results of an individualized welfare calculus, government policies on the CBA 
account are not attached to any identifiable agent who bears responsibility for their 
content or effect. Ultimately, this attempt to “regulate from nowhere” may be just as 
tenuous and self-defeating as the attempt to fix moral decisionmaking on a completely 
impartial assessment of consequences.177 
 
In contrast, the PP offers a simple but meaningful acknowledgment both of the 
distinctiveness of political communities and their collective choices, and of the 
overwhelming challenge of guiding such choices within a world of complexity, 
uncertainty, and interdependency between human individuals, societies, and generations. 
As will be argued, the PP’s apparent distinction between risks imposed and benefits 
foregone does not represent an inexcusable ignorance of opportunity costs, as critics 
claim, but rather a subtle yet significant reminder that public policymaking is at bottom 
an act of collective responsibility. The choice between individualist and collectivist 
conceptions, a foundational problem in political theory, is complicated in the 
environmental arena by the fact that the existing policymaking paradigms struggle to 
address many of the central questions raised by the sustainable development challenge, 
including most significantly the need to further our moral thinking concerning those 
interest holders who do not enter smoothly into conventional liberal frameworks. Thus, 
the PP’s deliberate attempt to “get the social organism thinking”178 may be desirable 
simply as a way of promoting the development of norms of global and intergenerational 
environmental responsibility at a time when such development is sorely needed.179 At the 
least, such an approach seems preferable to CBA’s implicit denial that collective agency 
and responsibility even exist. 
A. Partiality 
Part of the reason for the cognitive attractiveness of agent-relative theories of 
individual ethics lies in their ability to prevent our lives and our identities from receding 
entirely into the broader causal systems within which we are undoubtedly situated. As 
Bernard Williams famously argued, attaching some special moral significance to the 
affirmative expressions of an individual’s particular agency enables the “person [to be] 
                                                 
177 See Douglas A. Kysar & Li. Regulating from Nowhere:  Domestic Environmental Law and the 
Nation-State Subject (forthcoming in GLOBALIZATION COMES HOME: HOW THE UNITED STATES IS BEING 
TRANSFORMED BY GLOBALIZATION, Beverly Crawford & Michelle Bertho, eds.). 
178 LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB 299 (2001) (quoting letter from John Dewey).  
179 Cf. PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS, supra note __, at 351 (developing norms of 
intergenerational responsibility “is the most important part of our moral theory, since the next few centuries 
will be the most important in human history”). 
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identified with his actions as flowing from projects and attitudes which in some cases he 
takes seriously at the deepest level, as what his life is about.”180  
Complexity theory underscores the importance of this function by positing an 
expansive, yet simultaneously imperfect causal potential on the part of any single 
component within complex, adaptive systems. The challenge of crafting a moral identity 
within such a “complicated tissue of events”181 is especially profound: Not only does the 
individual face innumerable opportunities to act, but she also experiences her actions as 
deeply embedded within a causal order that belies the classical liberal belief in 
predictable dyadic causal relations.182 Accordingly, under a duty of impartial 
optimization, the poet’s “saddest” category—what “might have been”—would become 
much more than simply a reflective indication of the challenge of crafting an identity in a 
world of indefinitely many causal opportunities. Instead, it would become a reflexive 
imperative to act and choose in a manner that draws no boundaries between the human 
actor and the complex causal system within which she is situated. For this reason, 
deontologists hold onto much-maligned conceptions such as the act-omission distinction: 
Despite being endlessly manipulable183 and seemingly tolerant of unacceptable results in 
particular cases,184 such distinctions ultimately are necessary in order to preserve a 
coherent, stable conception of individual moral agency. 
Consequentialist-utilitarians, on the other hand, regard the act-omission 
distinction and other familiar manifestations of agent-relative ethics as evidence of 
cognitive “bias”185 that should be “escape[d].”186 In a recent lecture, for instance, Cass 
                                                 
180 Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in ETHICS 567, 582 (Steven M. Kahn & Peter 
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Sunstein speculates that the deontological moral tradition—particularly as it is expressed 
in such principles as the prohibition on affirmatively acting to cause a loss of human 
life—arises not from a full-fledged, independent philosophical framework, but from the 
use of “moral heuristics . . . or rules of thumb, that work well most of the time, but that 
also systematically misfire.”187 And, indeed, Sunstein believes that the Kantian 
prohibition on knowingly taking innocent human life misfires, “at least [when] the deaths 
are relatively few and an unintended byproduct of generally desirable activity.”188 
Instead, he argues that the normativity of action should be determined by a full and 
impartial evaluation of its expected consequences on relevant interest-holders. 
There is a conceptual problem, however, with the utilitarian ideal of impartial 
causal optimization. As Samuel Scheffler has explained, a normative standard of 
“instrumental optimality” for individuals—which attaches no special significance to the 
actions, interests, or other features of the agent herself—must derive its moral attraction, 
paradoxically, from “considerations other than instrumental optimality.”189 The contrary 
notion that instrumental optimality has primary normative significance faces inescapable 
complications. For instance, as decision theorists have demonstrated, there may be 
circumstances in which the deliberate attempt to optimize may not be the most sure route 
to optimization.190 Knowing when and how to depart from the optimization calculus in 
favor of more pragmatically sensible approaches therefore implies the existence of some 
independent agent responding to at least some additional normative criteria. Similarly, 
the desirability of holding oneself to a norm of instrumental optimality cannot be 
premised on a judgment that it is the instrumentally optimal thing to do—“[I]f it did, one 
would need already to have accepted the norm in order to see oneself as having reason to 
accept it, which means that the proposed derivation is circular.”191 To avoid such 
circularity, one first must posit an independent human subject who views herself as 
peculiarly responsible for the affirmative expressions of her moral agency, in the sense 
that those expressions are guided by reasons that she herself has considered and chosen. 
That very brand of discretion, however, seems to be what impartial utilitarianism 
eliminates from our moral reasoning.  
Scheffler’s argument bears some relationship to Daniel Markovits’s earlier effort 
to construct an account of “the necessary architecture of the first person,” in which 
Markovits argues that any meaningful conception of personal moral agency must include 
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a recognition of oneself not only as an agent responsive to reasons for acting, but also as 
a generator of reasons, including reasons that are intimately and uniquely one’s own.192 
While Scheffler argues that the mere fact that individuals view themselves as subject to 
moral norms of any sort implies that they must accept a distinction between their agency 
and the larger causal order, Markovits argues that a minimal logical requirement of 
individuals being able to coherently view themselves as moral agents is an ability to 
supply reasons for acting that are not solely dictated by an external normative theory, 
such as the optimization rubric underlying CBA. From either perspective, the rub is that 
by urging a standard of agent-neutral utilitarianism, causal optimizers also implicitly ask 
us to deny the belief that our judgments and our actions are morally distinctive—the very 
belief that seems to be a minimally necessary precondition for having reason to accept 
any theory of normative ethics. 
Defenders of optimization might respond that the conceptual “separateness” of 
moral agents is maintained in their framework by the fact that the utilitarian calculus 
takes account of an individual’s own particular causal position and information set in 
calculating  optimal courses of action. Optimizers, however, have no way of cabining this 
logic, for presumably individuals also should choose to position themselves within causal 
settings and to invest in obtaining information in a manner that is calculated to achieve 
optimal outcomes.193 Soon enough, this duty of causal optimality becomes infinitely self-
referential, and the individual becomes lost within a framework that achieves its goal of 
consistent moral treatment only by denying the very basis on which individuals have 
come to think of themselves as distinct moral agents.  
Indeed, the optimization framework is not only unhinged—in the sense that it 
exogenizes the process by which its intended audience develops and maintains a sense of 
personal urgency concerning the framework’s subject matter—but it also is expressed in 
a formal language that implicitly condemns the discretion and judgment of its subjects. 
Like any other theory of normative ethics, optimization depends for its relevance and 
coherence on the existence of agents who are empowered to respond to reasons for 
acting, including at least some reasons for acting that are entirely independent of an 
externally imposed normative framework.194 Unlike theories of normative ethics that do 
not aspire to comprehensive rationality, however, the formal language of optimization by 
its very nature tends to disparage any such independent reasons for acting. That is, the 
formalized moral world of impartial optimization offers a series of stark choices: fairness 
versus welfare, precaution versus maximization, subjectivity versus rationality. Thus, 
although the optimization framework depends for its persuasiveness on the continued 
self-awareness and cognitive independence of the agents it seeks to persuade, its 
axiomatic structure simultaneously and unavoidably condemns those agents’ independent 
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judgment as leading to sub-optimal outcomes. It is hard to imagine under such a 
conception how individuals would preserve a sense of themselves as distinctive moral 
actors who should abide any notions of virtue and responsibility.  
B. Collectivity 
Early domestic efforts to eliminate ozone-depleting substances in the United 
States were based almost exclusively on theoretical arguments as to their potential for 
harm, a classic example of precautionary regulation in the face of incomplete information 
regarding potentially disastrous environmental harms. Years later, empirical 
investigations confirm the grounds of the scientific community’s earlier concerns, and 
cost-benefit analyses now are capable of “verifying” the wisdom of that earlier 
precautionary action. Significantly, however, precautionary wisdom emerged at the time 
of that earlier action from a political body that saw itself as standing outside of, and being 
critically disposed toward, its tools of risk assessment and welfare maximization.195  
Indeed, at the time that the United States led the global effort to reduce the use of ozone-
depleting substances, computer programs were rejecting satellite data on the extent of 
loss in the ozone layer as being too far from the range of expected results to be valid.196   
Today, the precautionary approach is derided by U.S. policy elites as a “mythical 
concept . . . like a unicorn.”197 Yet if the analysis of the previous Section translates at all 
smoothly from the individual to the collective context, then the precautionary approach 
makes a great deal more concrete sense than PP critics appreciate: Even granting the 
causal optimizer’s claim that “risks are on all sides of social situations,”198 this fact alone 
should not compel the adoption of an optimization standard, such as CBA, in which risks 
imposed and opportunities foregone are treated as analytically indistinguishable. Such a 
homogenized conception of the causal order threatens to undermine the basis on which 
moral agents have come to think of their actions as especially deserving of deliberation, 
choice, and responsibility. Put differently, no coherent conception of moral agency—
even a collective one—can fully deny the distinctiveness of the agent’s choices and 
actions in the manner compelled by impartial utilitarianism. Instead, something like the 
“first, do no harm” admonition of precautionary adages may be desirable simply for the 
implicit reminder contained within it, that the particular political community’s actions 
and decisions carry distinctive moral weight. 
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Of course, the desirable degree of agent-relativity for individual human actors 
does not necessarily supply the desirable degree for collective actors.199 Most basically, 
the classic objections to fully impartial utilitarianism—that it disrupts a life filled with 
projects and meaning,200 or that it precludes special affiliations to family, friends, and 
colleagues201—seem inapplicable to an institution that is charged, not with crafting an 
individual identity, but with serving the collective good of society. Indeed, one might 
argue that such institutions should be conceived and operated without any distinction 
between the effects of their policies, and the effects that are attributable to the larger 
causal system within which they operate. Institutional responsibility instead should be for 
the fate of the entire system, unmediated by the “raft of baggage of personal attachments, 
commitments, principles and prejudices” that comprise an individual’s narrative 
history.202 
Practical considerations support this line of reasoning. Unlike individuals, who 
could never fulfill a duty of causal optimality with anything other than profound 
incompleteness,203 human groups and institutions are thought to be able to more perfectly 
realize such a duty. Institutional actors can promulgate rules and distribute costs in a 
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broad-sweeping manner that individuals in their private lives could not replicate.204 Also, 
as philosopher Michael Green argues, “[i]nstitutions are better than individuals at 
collecting and processing information about the distant or indirect consequences of their 
actions.”205 Indeed, not only can institutional actors countenance a much greater spatial 
scope of concern than individuals, but they also can adopt a greater temporal scope of 
concern, given their legally fictitious immortality.206 For these reasons, we may conclude 
that the criticisms traditionally lodged against utilitarianism for individuals fail to apply 
at the level of the nation-state and that, instead, an optimization rubric of the sort 
underlying CBA is especially desirable as a philosophy for government conduct.207 
The metaethical points raised in the previous Section still remain, however, for 
some normative justification other than causal optimality is necessary to ground the 
conclusion that social actors should conform to an optimality standard. At bottom, the 
various arguments offered in favor of “Government house utilitarianism” reduce to 
statements that social actors and institutions can pursue causal optimality with fewer 
constraints and unintended side effects than individuals. Following Scheffler’s argument 
on the individual level, however, it is not enough to say that social actors and institutions 
should optimize simply because it is the socially optimal thing to do. Not only is this 
statement sometimes empirically false,208 but it also is conceptually problematic in that it 
is incapable of explaining the embedded assumption that social institutions should do 
anything—that is, that the decisionmaking of such institutions should be the subject of 
norms of any sort. The reason for that assumption is that we implicitly recognize such 
institutions as “separate” moral agents, rather than simply as passive instruments of 
optimization. That is, even when we try to program our institutions to be “hostage to 
what the facts turn out to show in particular domains,”209 our very act of programming 
concedes the moral distinctiveness of our institutional creations—and the possibility that 
they might be programmed according to other visions of societal flourishing. 
Deep below the push for CBA therefore seems to lurk the same conception of 
collectivity that the methodology’s proponents regard as suspect within the PP. For either 
approach to have compelling, persuasive, or even recognizable significance as a standard 
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of social choice, it is necessary first to conceive of human institutions and societies as 
distinctive agents that can respond to reasons, articulate goals, and maintain self-
awareness regarding the moral urgency of social policies. A necessary predicate for that 
conception, in turn, is to reject CBA’s insistence that social choice can be reduced to a 
ministerial act of aggregation. Try as we might to deny it, the embrace of “Government 
house utilitarianism” is much more than a practical decision involving the institutional 
satisfaction of individual interests. It is a choice that reveals something intimate and 
foundational about our collective moral identity—something that will be lauded, 
lamented, or viewed indifferently by future generations, but that will always be seen as 
uniquely ours.  
As described in the next Section, unlike CBA, the PP embraces this fact of 
collective self-determination, and opens up space to meet the profound responsibilities 
contained within it. 
C. Moral Rationality 
Contrary to prominent critiques, the PP does not require us to embrace a 
fallacious belief that the larger causal fabric is benevolent210 or that human omissions are 
perfectly innocuous.211 Nor does it necessitate a return to the mistaken view that we can 
identify a stable “balance of nature” that exists beyond the influence of humans.212 Nor, 
finally, does the PP require that that we abandon the attempt to foster specific positive 
duties at the societal level (that is, institutional duties to act on the opportunity to prevent 
or alleviate suffering). The PP does, however, imply the view that human agents, whether 
individually or collectively, bear moral responsibility in a way that other causal forces do 
not and, thus, the decisionmaking of such agents should be conducted with a sense of 
moral urgency and self-awareness. Denying such a notion in favor of the fully impartial 
optimization rubric invites a slippery slope of instrumentalist decisionmaking in which 
moral boundaries are not only crossed routinely, but crossed without regret. 
                                                 
210 Critics often believe that adherence to the PP suggests that individuals naively regard the status 
quo, the non-human, or the “normal” causal order as benign. See Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary 
Principle, supra note __, at 1009 (arguing that the “mistaken belief that nature is essentially benign . . . 
often informs the precautionary principle”). Although most PP proponents harbor no such illusion, the 
more fundamental point is that some counterfactual baseline (such as the “normal” causal order absent 
one’s actions) is necessary in order for any form of moral reasoning about human behavior to coherently 
proceed. See Moore. After all, CBA has a baseline of its own, premised on a market liberal conception in 
which existing economic arrangements and preferences are given privileged status. See Kysar, Sustainable 
Development, supra note __. 
211 Michael Moore’s contrary argument—that human omissions are “literally nothing at all”—
seems just as difficult to sustain as the utilitarian notion that human actions are indistinguishable from other 
causal forces. MICHAEL MOORE, ACT AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR 
CRIMINAL LAW 28 (1993). In both cases, the critical missing element is an appreciation for the role played 
by human choice and agency. See Fletcher, supra note __, at 1444 (arguing that “the only kind of omitting 
that is interesting is the kind in which human agency is expressed”). 
212 See A. Dan Tarlock, The Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial Unraveling of 
Environemntal Law, 27 LOY. L. A. L. REV. 1121 (1994).  
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Some authors argue that a separate or distinct notion of collective agency in this 
manner “may not even be intelligible” and is, at least, of “obscure” moral relevance.213 
This argument, while correct to the extent that it recognizes a larger scope of causal 
potential and moral obligation for the prevention of suffering by institutional actors, 
overshoots to the extent that it draws no distinction whatsoever between a political 
community and the larger causal order. After all, the same challenge that exists on the 
individual level—the challenge of pursuing morally desirable outcomes when the agent’s 
causal potential both is filled with opportunities for acting and simultaneously is 
constrained by the omnipresence and power of other causal forces—also exists on the 
collective level. Even robust institutional actors such as nation-states confront a phalanx 
of forces that lie beyond complete prediction and control, such as the operations of 
natural systems that escape precise probabilistic understanding, the actions of foreign 
nations and other non-subjects that depend on and impact shared resources,214 and the 
future needs and circumstances of unborn generations that are a necessary but 
unknowable feature of any policy decision involving intergenerational consequences.  
At times, the challenge of defining and performing a political role within this 
context becomes dramatically apparent. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, for 
instance, one anonymous White House official initially sought to deflect criticism of the 
Bush Administration’s response by arguing, “Normal people at home understand that it’s 
not the president who’s responsible for this, it’s the hurricane.”215 Four days later, with 
criticism mounting, President Bush embraced the opposite normative extreme, one in 
which the scope of the government’s responsibility appeared to be co-extensive with the 
entire causal order: “As long as any life is in danger, we’ve got work to do.”216 As a 
statement of government responsibility for hurricane prevention and disaster relief, the 
latter quotation seems more desirable than the former quotation, which trades on a strong 
prescriptive version of the act-omission distinction that should be rejected. What both 
quotations share, however, is an acknowledgment of the state as an independently 
significant moral actor, one for which even an apparent duty of causal optimality can 
only be imposed as a result of reasoning, choice, and responsibility. 
                                                 
213 Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note __, at 6.  
214 A single “risk monster” nation, for instance, may threaten unpalatable consequences for global 
environmental problems such as climate change, just as one “utility monster” threatens unpalatable 
consequences on the individual level. Cf. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 110 (1974) 
(observing that “[u]tilitarian theory is embarrassed by the possibility of utility monsters who get 
enormously greater sums of utility from any sacrifice of others than these others lose”). In that respect, the 
fact that most of the industrialized world has pressed on with the Kyoto Protocol despite the overall 
tepidness of the document and the unwillingness of the United States to participate in the regime suggests 
that, to those nations, expected consequences do not fully determine the normativity of state action. Instead, 
the basis of climate policy in these nations seems to be a conviction that human societies and human 
generations owe each other certain moral responsibilities—responsibilities that must be discharged with 
care and caution in light of the deep uncertainty that accompanies global environmental disruption. 
215 Scott Shane & Eric Lipton, Government Saw Flood Risk But Not Levee Failure, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 2, 2005 (quoting a White House official “who asked not to be named because he did not want to be 
seen as talking about the crisis in political terms”). 
216 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/20050905-9.html. 
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The PP embraces the distinctiveness of collective decisionmaking. The political 
community that adopts and implements a precautionary approach does so with a 
recognition of itself as a member of a larger geopolitical and temporal community of 
communities. On this account, risk regulation is not merely an opportunity to maximize 
an existing set of individual welfare functions, but rather a moment to consider the 
regulating body’s obligations to its present and future members, to other political 
communities, and perhaps even to other species.217 Such notions of decidedly collective 
responsibility are well demonstrated by the original German articulation of the PP, 
Vorsorgeprinzip, which translates literally as “beforehand or prior care and worry” and 
which includes notions of “caring for or looking after, fretting or worrying about and 
obtaining provisions, or providing for.”218 Through these relational constructs, the PP 
offers a subtle, but constant reminder that the relevant political community’s decisions 
express a collective identity—an identity that the community must in an important and 
unavoidable sense own.219 
Rather than emerge from collective deliberation by a political community, 
policies adopted under the CBA approach instead are said to “inevitably and predictably” 
flow from the calculated effects of state action.220 Even assuming (unrealistically) that 
adequate knowledge is available to perform this ministerial conception of policymaking, 
it is unclear how CBA’s results can retain authority over time, given that the framework 
implicitly denies the distinctiveness of its own audience. That is, rather than appearing 
within the CBA framework as responsive—and responsible—subjects of moral 
reasoning, the individuals collectively comprising CBA’s political community instead 
appear as simply part of the furniture of the optimization paradigm, the underlying 
normativity of which is likely to become increasingly obscure over time. The end result 
of such a conception may be a form of moral anesthetizing,221 one that occurs at precisely 
                                                 
217 See, e.g., Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?--Toward Legal Rights for 
Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972) (arguing that law can, and should, view animals and other 
natural objects as having value and dignity in their own right).  One continues to find supporters of Stone’s 
position in the environmental law literature.  See, e.g, Alyson C. Flournoy, In Search of an Environmental 
Ethic, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 63 (2003) (arguing that environmental ethics should play a stronger role in 
environmental law and policy); Alyson C. Flournoy, Building an Environmental Ethic from the Ground Up, 
37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 53 (2003) (supporting a transition away from exclusively human-centered 
utilitarianism as the foundation of environmental policy).  However, William F. Baxter’s classic work 
articulating the anthropocentric view, PEOPLE OR PENGUINS: THE CASE FOR OPTIMAL POLLUTION (1974), 
seems to have had the more dominant impact on environmental law and scholarship.  See Barton H. 
Thompson, Jr., People or Prairie Chickens:  The Uncertain Search for Optimal Biodiversity, 51 STAN. L. 
REV. 1127, 1127-28 (1999). 
218 S. Boehmer-Christiansen, The Precautionary Principle in Germany – Enabling Government, in 
INTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 34, 38 (Timothy O’Riordan & James Cameron eds., 1994) 
(emphasis added). 
219 Cf. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 23 
(1970) (“What we choose [in response to the problem of accidents], whether intentionally or by default, 
will reflect the economic and moral goals of our society.”); GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBIT, TRAGIC 
CHOICES 17 (1978) (noting that societies must inevitably choose who suffers and by how much and that 
“[i]n this way societies are defined”). 
220 Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note __, at 19. 
221 I am grateful to Bill Eskridge for suggesting this phrase. 
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the moment when sensitivity and self-awareness regarding the deep uncertainty, 
complexity, and normativity of risk regulation are most in need. 
The danger of moral anesthetizing seems to represent a problem not only for those 
who would invest CBA with foundational normative significance, but also for those who 
regard CBA simply as a decision procedure with practical worth in particular political 
settings. In Adler and Posner’s view, for instance, CBA does not have “bedrock moral 
status,” but instead serves only as a pragmatically useful mechanism for pursuing other 
values, such as overall well-being, that do have primary moral significance.222 The 
underlying conceptual problems raised by Gödel’s Incompleteness Theroem,223 however, 
may haunt even those who defend CBA in this more pragmatic sense. The problem lies in 
the fact that the formal language of the cost-benefit framework is not only irreducibly 
incomplete; it also is capable of denying its own incompleteness.224 That is, even as 
CBA’s moderate proponents depict the procedure as an aid to decisionmaking that is to 
be supplemented by other considerations, CBA implicitly and unavoidably condemns 
those other considerations as undesirable. Again, the tautological conclusion of the 
formalized welfarist framework is that subjectivity and fairness necessarily derograte 
from rationality and welfare. It is hard to see how such a framework can remain properly 
limited to its actual sphere of competency, as CBA’s pragmatic defenders would have it, 
given that the framework offers the seductive possibility of translating all relevant 
variables into its language of optimization.   
CONCLUSION 
Despite the underappreciated coherence and wisdom of the PP, the problem 
remains that the principle by itself does not provide adequate substantive guidance as to 
how its various safety valves should be utilized. Nor does the principle tell us how to 
implement those safety valves in a manner that is consistent with the simultaneous 
demands of adaptive expertise and democratic legitimacy. Nor finally does the PP 
directly grapple with the profound intellectual and practical challenges of squaring a 
theory of intergenerational responsibility with liberal political theory.225 Development of 
such important issues will have to await further work.226 For now, it is enough to note 
that the task will require both humility regarding our powers of prediction and control, 
and courage regarding our ability to engage in a form of public decisionmaking that 
conceives of human societies and human generations as collective moral actors with their 
own agency, responsibility, and history.  
The risks of oppression raised by such a collective vision are well known and 
justly feared. But the consequentialist-utilitarianism of CBA has a less-recognized 
oppressive force of its own: By completely rejecting the distinctiveness of moral agency, 
CBA leads to a radical erasure of boundaries not only between individuals, but also 
                                                 
222 Adler & Posner, supra note __, at 195. 
223 See supra text accompanying notes 118-119. 
224 See supra text accompanying notes 193-194. 
225 See Kysar, Sustainable Development, supra note __. 
226 See KYSAR, supra note __. 
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between generations—a compressing of human history into a single moment of maximal 
net benefit, devoid of identities, relations, and responsibilities. As such, the optimization 
rubric invites an ethical counterpart to nanotechology’s “gray goo” nightmare: a slippery 
universe of homogenized interests and influences in which the very distinctiveness of 
human identity and agency is slowly, but irretrievably erased. Put differently, the most 
basic normative message of the PP, the Hippocratic adage, and other precautionary 
maxims—the reminder above all else to be moral227—cannot be located within the 
optimization paradigm. To the contrary, the optimization paradigm works to render such 
a message unintelligible, for it erases the kinds of distinctions that enable us to identify 
moral agents to whom the reminder might be directed. 
As this Article has argued, such a conception is incapable of long sustaining the 
notion that its results have compelling moral significance. Even complete acceptance of 
the causal optimality approach of CBA must depend on moral reasons for acceptance that 
find their source elsewhere than simply in a desire to optimize. Yet the political 
communities whose moral convictions supply this source hold no clear or secure place in 
the philosophy of optimization. Instead, the staunchly individualistic foundation of CBA 
denies political communities the capacity to collectively articulate their goals and ideals, 
a failing that seems especially problematic for policies impacting foreign nations, future 
generations, and other interest holders that are not already present in the optimization 
calculus. For such policies, a notion of collective agency provides the most analytically 
appropriate frame of evaluation, as it permits the political community to perceive itself as 
standing in relations of responsibility with and historical connection to those other 
political communities. Under CBA, on the other hand, those individuals whose lives are 
statistically, spatially, or temporally dispersed become subtly conscripted without their 
consent into a disembodied pursuit of utility-maximization. Indeed, under the 
optimization rubric, the “monetary equivalents” of their lives may be traded away for a 
few weeks extension of the golf season. No amount of theorizing can make the sacrificed 
“better off” in the bargain. 
________ 
                                                 
227 See supra text accompanying notes 45-49. 
